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ENTRAPMENT WHEN THE SPOKEN WORD IS
THE CRIME
James F. Ponsoldt"and Stephen Marsh"
INTRODUCTION

between Kenneth Starr's Office of
Independent Counsel ("OIC") and Monica Lewinsky received a
HE year-long struggle

great deal of public attention, particularly the nature of the unusual
"deal" for transactional immunity negotiated between them. Now,
perhaps, it is time for reflection upon one of the less publicized, but
highly relevant issues, in the Lewinsky investigation: the uncertain
parameters of the federal common law of entrapment, particularly in
the context of white collar or mens rea crimes.
As is speculated in this Article, the OIC claimed to be in a position
to indict Lewinsky and/or her mother for some form of obstruction of
justice, possibly witness tampering,1 based on tape recordings made by
Linda Tripp. According to media commentators, particularly former
prosecutors, this use of an agent/informant is not uncommon, nor is it
controversial to employ informants to obtain evidence of a crime.2
While many have debated the morality of Tripp's private decision
to tape Lewinsky, not enough attention has been paid to the
* Joseph Henry Lumpkin Professor of Law, University of Georgia; J.D.,
Harvard, 1972; A.B., Cornell, 1968.
** J.D., University of Georgia School of Law, 1997. The authors express
gratitude for assistance provided by the University of Georgia summer research fund.
1. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512 (1994). Indeed, the subsequent OIC report to
Congress alleged that President Clinton and, by implication, Lewinsky, violated those
statutes when devising and implementing "cover stories" to disguise their sexual
relationship. See The Report and The Response, Atl.-J. Const., Sept. 12, 1998, at BI.
Interestingly, the report refers to the January 13-15 conversations: "In a recorded
conversation that day, January 15, Ms. Lewinsky encouraged Ms. Tripp not to
disclose her (Lewinsky's) relationship with the President. Ms. Lewinsky tried to
persuade Ms. Tripp to lie .... Id.
2. Wiring witnesses to obtain evidence of past criminal activity is not uncommon.
Doing so to induce the crime, when the crime consists of spoken words (i.e., "lie for
me" or "vote our way and there will be more money where this came from") is the
focus of this Article. Allegedly, the key recording was a final one in which the OIC
wired Tripp for another meeting with Lewinsky with instructions regarding the nature
of the incriminating statements needed from Lewinsky (i.e., persuading Tripp to lie or
withhold testimony). In other words, the OIC may have directed Tripp to induce
Lewinsky to unambiguously commit the crime of witness tampering-a crime which
probably would not have occurred without such a specific solicitation.
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prosecutorial decision to subsequently wire Tripp with instructions to
induce criminal conduct, in the nature of additional comments, from
Lewinsky. This incident is the most public illustration of the need for
a renewed focus on the highly ambiguous common law concept of
"entrapment" in federal law, particularly when the criminal charge in
question has, as a primary element, the uncertain and changing state
of mind of the target because the spoken word is both the actus reus
and the primary evidence of mens rea. That targets of criminal
investigations may be "willing" or predisposed to commit an offense
when directed by a government informant, but would not likely have
committed such an offense without that direction, is the focus of
debate still surrounding the Supreme Court's seven-year-old decision
in Jacobson v. United States.3
Coloring the debate has been the recent practice of independent
counsels, prior to the expiration of the independent counsel statute, to
seek expansion of their jurisdiction when they uncovered collateral
criminal conduct. In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers,4 the
Supreme Court defined the mens rea element of the illegal gratuities
statute as requiring proof that the defendant paid (or received)
something of value "because of" a specific official act rather than
unidentified or expected
official acts in general, or the recipient's
"official position."5 The Court held that Sun Diamond, a donor to the
former Secretary of Agriculture, Mike Espy, was entitled to have its
criminal conviction vacated because "in order to establish a violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), the Government must prove a link
between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a
specific 'official act' for or because of which it was given."6 The line
was thus drawn between criminal conduct and traditional campaign
contributions based upon the specific or non-specific mens rea of the
7
donor or recipient (which may differ from one another).
In an obstruction case, such as witness tampering, a jury is
instructed that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted "corruptly."' In United States v. Farrell,9 the court
3. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
4. 119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999).

5. See id. at 1406.
6. See id. at 1411.
7. This is a fertile field for future entrapment decisions, whose resolutions should
refine procedures used in targeting criminal defendants for prosecution.
8. In relevant part, 18 U.S.C. § 1512 provides: "(b) Whoever... corruptly
persuades another person ... with intent to ...(2) ... induce any person to (A)
withhold testimony... ; (B) ...conceal an object .... 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1994). The
OIC's Report to Congress characterizes several activities by President Clinton as
witness tampering but the published excerpts lack any focus on the element of
"corruptly." See generally Office of Independent Counsel, Referral to the United
States House of Representatives pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 595(c), H.R. Doc. No. 105310 (2d Sess. 1998) (setting forth President Clinton's allegedly corrupt activities,
including perjury for which he was subsequently impeached). The same element must
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recognized that, "the phrase 'corruptly persuades' [is] ambiguous....
[T]he phrase cannot mean simply 'persuades with the intent to hinder
communication to law enforcement."' 10 Applying these rules to the
OIC's investigation, pre-existing evidence of Lewinsky's state of mind
in allegedly attempting to dissuade Tripp from testifying truthfully in
a private civil action in which Lewinsky was not a party (i.e., the Paula
Jones case) might have fallen short of proving "corruptly." Thus, the
importance of Tripp's final effort to direct Lewinsky toward an
unambiguous effort at "tampering" with Tripp, at the specific
direction of the OIC, cannot be overstated. If Lewinsky had a solid
entrapment defense, her need to cooperate with the OIC and
thereafter present rehearsed testimony to the grand jury to
incriminate President Clinton or others would have been diminished.
Additionally, the OIC would have been forced to immunize, indict, or
disregard her without her promise of cooperation and rehearsal and
accept the consequences in any grand jury, impeachment, or trial
proceedings targeting others, including Clinton.
Ordinarily, defense lawyers rely on the entrapment defense only as
a last resort, because such a defense functionally requires an
admission of culpability. Generally, it is difficult to claim, "I didn't do
it, but if I did the Government entrapped me." In a white collar case
focusing on the defendant's mens rea, however, it is more reasonable
to argue that, "I don't deny what I did, or what I said, but my motive
was innocent. If I sound corrupt in this particular tape recording, the
prosecutor intentionally created that effect through his agent." The
use of informants is not only relevant to witness tampering. The
potential use of government informants to create the crimes of bribery
or unlawful gratuities," when the payment of money to a public
official might initially have been intended as a lawful campaign
contribution, is obvious: asking a target to relate the contribution to a
specific public act or vote could suffice. 2
be proven in 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See generally United States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267,
1280-82 (11th Cir. 1997) (discussing general requirements and focusing on the
"corruptly" element).
9. 126 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1997).

10. Id. at 487.
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)-(c). Bribery, in § 201(b)(1), also includes -corruptly"

as an element: promising or receiving a thing of value to or by a federal official to
influence or induce an official act, if done "corruptly," constitutes bribery. The
gratuities statute, at 18 U.S.C. § 201(c), requires neither proof of a corrupt motive nor
a specific quid pro quo. In fact, as a Tenth Circuit panel held last year (although later
reversed by the en banc court), 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), prohibiting the offer of

"anything of value" for testimony under oath, literally would have criminalized the
offer of transactional immunity to Lewinsky by the 0IC. See United States v.
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1355 (10th Cir. 1998), vacated en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th

Cir. 1999), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 2371 (1999).
12.

Because there is no quid pro quo requirement for a conviction under 18

U.S.C. § 201(c), wiring a witness to obtain a statement by anyone who has given
anything of value to that or another witness that relates the gift to the testimony, or
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What is the current state of federal law regarding the defense of
entrapment when raised by a defendant induced by a government
agent to commit a crime, particularly in white collar cases focusing on
spoken words? Should routine prosecutorial use of wired witnesses
ostensibly to corroborate the target's state of mind in otherwise
ambiguous situations, where the defendant's "crime" literally occurs
during the orchestrated conversation, receive additional scrutiny?
These questions have particular force because the elements of several
white collar offenses, including obstruction, perjury, 3 fraud, 14 and
bribery, frequently fail to distinguish clearly between criminal and
legitimate conduct.
The task of this Article is to assess the competing approaches that
circuit courts have taken in defining the predisposition element in
entrapment cases. It then attempts to try to reconcile them, not only
with Jacobson v. United States,15 but also with policy concerns
underlying the rest of the Supreme Court's entrapment jurisprudence,
particularly in light of the increased politicization of federal criminal
law through investigations of public officials' conduct by independent
counsel. This Article will first frame the central issue, the
supplementary mens rea requirement arising in entrapment cases.
Part II then will review the common law development of the federal
entrapment defense, in the context of an independent counsel
investigation of public officials for mens rea crimes, with particular
emphasis on the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Jacobson v. United
States. Part III will detail the two essentially divergent views that
circuit courts have taken over the meaning of the term
"predisposition" in the wake of the Court's decision in Jacobson,
including the 1994 opinion by Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Hollingsworth.6 The Article will explain
that Hollingworth's interpretation of Jacobson that when, "but for"
the Government's inducement, the defendant objectively would not
have committed the offense in question, is incomplete. Part IV will
attempt to reconcile the competing approaches with the Court's
previous entrapment decisions in an attempt to ascertain which
approach is most consistent with its prior entrapment jurisprudence
and which best helps attain the contemporary goal of reducing the
"political" component of criminal judicial enforcement. The Article
concludes that a more appropriate focus for judicial or jury
application of the dispositive "predisposition" test for entrapment is
vote, even after the fact, could become a more common way to "police" campaign
contributions.
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621. This statute prohibits "willfully" making a "material"
false statement under oath. Id.
14. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346.
15. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
16. 7 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994).
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on the objectively historical evidence of the defendant's prior similar
acts (justifying the Government's initial decision to target the
defendant) and his or her initial responses to government inducement
(justifying any continued targeting). 7
I.

FRAMING THE ENTRAPMENT ISSUE AS A SUPPLEMENTARY MENS
REA REQUIREMENT

In 1932, the Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States"8 recognized
for the first time the federal defense of entrapment. Relying on the
"presumed" intent of Congress, the Court held that law enforcement
methods used to incite crimes might entitle some criminal defendants
to an acquittal. 19 At the time, the Court's decision to recognize the
entrapment defense was rather uncontroversial. In fact, only one
member of the Court agreed with the conclusion of the circuit court
that no such defense existed?2 However, the remaining members of
the Court did not agree about the proper source from which the
entrapment defense should flow.2 Consequently, the Court struggled
to define the parameters of this new defense.
For years, the debate primarily focused on whether the entrapment
defense should be an objective or subjective inquiry. The proponents
of the "objective" view claimed that the entire focus should be on the
Government's conduct in a case where an entrapment defense is
asserted. 22 Under this view, a court's task would be to assess the law
enforcement techniques at issue to determine whether they violate

17. Under the tests proposed in this Article, therefore, based upon the "talking

points" prepared by Lewinsky, and Lewinsky's apparently unhesitating response to
Linda Tripp, any hypothetical entrapment defense offered by Lewinsky likely would
have failed. See, e.g., United States v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 279 (7th Cir. 1999)

(affirming rejection of entrapment defense in bribery case).
18. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
19. See id. at 448. The government's conduct will not autontatically entitle a
defendant to an acquittal because of the Court's further requirement that a defendant
lack predisposition in order to successfully assert the entrapment defense. See infra
note 28.
20. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453 (McReynolds, J., dissenting without opinion).
Justice McReynolds believed that the decision of the circuit court, finding no
entrapment as a matter of law, should be affirmed. See id. To be precise, the circuit
court in Sorrells did believe that some sort of entrapment defense was available. But

under its view, the entrapment "defense" applied in situations where the defendant

actually lacked the requisite intent to commit the underlying offense. See id. at 442.

Thus, the "defense" of entrapment envisioned by the circuit court was not really a
defense at all but instead was an attempt by a defendant to prove that the prima facie

elements of the crime were not present.
21. See id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring). Instead of relying on the intent of
Congress, Justice Roberts argued that the entrapment defense rested upon a
"fundamental rule of public policy" that allowed courts to protect the "purity of its

own temple." See id.
22. See id. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring) ("The applicable principle is that courts
must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents.").
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some sort of acceptable standard.23 In contrast, the proponents of the
"subjective" view believed that the Government's conduct is only a
threshold concern.
Government conduct must, of course, be
evaluated, but even if the Government's conduct is sufficiently
egregious, the inquiry does not end.24 Instead, at that point, the
Government must be given an opportunity to show that the criminal
defendant was "predisposed" to commit the crimes charged.25 If so,
the entrapment defense will fail. 26 Thus, by focusing on the state of
mind of the individual defendant who asserts the entrapment defense,
a court is said to be engaging in a subjective inquiry. In other words,
when the Government induces a crime, it must be prepared to prove
not only that the target had the requisite mens rea at the time he
committed the crime but also that he possessed that mens rea before
any government inducement.
As a practical matter, those advocating the "subjective" view of

entrapment have prevailed, but their position requires further
clarification.27 The Court has definitively held that a defendant must
23. See United States v. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct
itself is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental
power.").
24. See generally United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that under the subjective view of the entrapment defense, a
predisposed defendant cannot prevail "regardless of the nature and extent of the
Government's participation."). Although the egregiousness of the Government's
conduct will never alone be dispositive in an entrapment case, the Court in Russell did
recognize that some forms of law enforcement activity might violate a defendant's
due process rights. See id. at 431-32. When this is the case, instead of asserting an
entrapment defense, the defendant must assert an "outrageous conduct" defense. See
United States v. Dyman, 739 F.2d 762, 768 (2d Cir. 1984). The parameters of the
"outrageous conduct" defense are beyond the scope of this Article. For discussions of
the defense, see generally Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment
Cases: The Journey Back, 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 457 (1990) (supporting the growing
use of due process principles in entrapment cases).
25. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451; see also Russell, 411 U.S. at 433-36 (recognizing
the concerns voiced by proponents of the objective view but declining to eliminate the
predisposition requirement out of respect for stare decisis as well as the concerns
voiced by the Court in Sherman); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 377 n.7 (repeating the
concerns voiced by Judge Learned Hand that if no reply were made to the fact of the
government's inducement, "'it would be impossible ever to secure convictions of any
offences which consist of transactions that are carried on in secret').
26. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 436 (finding that the defendant's concession that a
reasonable jury could have found him predisposed was "fatal to his claim of
entrapment").
27. See Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, The Entrapment
Defense, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 205, 214 (1995) [hereinafter, Marcus, Back from the [Almost]
Dead] ("Debate concerning the two tests is over at the Supreme Court level."). The
respective merits of these two views have been fully debated and need not be further
explored in this Article. As an intellectual matter, academics can continue the debate
over the propriety of having a predisposition inquiry. See generally Paul Marcus, The
Entrapment Defense (1989) (presenting a comprehensive evaluation of the
entrapment defense).
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lack predisposition in order to successfully assert an entrapment
defense. Now, the only real source of debate concerns the content of
this predisposition inquiry: how do prosecutors prove and juries
determine and distinguish the two-step temporal mens rea element?
Since the Sorrells decision in 1932, the Court has handed down
several opinions that directly address the entrapment defense in
federal court. 29 Unfortunately, the decisions by the Court have often

prompted more questions than answers. Jacobson v. United States,"
the Court's most recent pronouncement concerning the entrapment
defense, is no exception. Although Jacobson was initially thought to
address only the "timing" of the predisposition analysis,- circuit
courts now have split over whether the Court instead redefined
predisposition to include an additional objective component 2 For
clarity's sake, it should be emphasized that no circuit court believes
that the Court has adopted a purely "objective" approach to
entrapment. Again, that debate is over, and the proponents of the
subjective view have won, even if this subjective view remains difficult
to apply.33 Hence, every entrapment defense necessitates a subjective
inquiry that focuses on the predisposition of the individual defendant.
Accepting that premise, however, begs the further question as to
what this term "predisposition" means: does "predisposition," itself,
contain an objective element to help distinguish that inquiry from the
original mens rea component of the offense? Whatever agreement
that may have existed regarding the meaning of predisposition has
28. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 423; see also Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63
(1988) ("A valid entrapment defense has two related elements: government

inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to
engage in the criminal conduct"). In Mathews, any lingering doubts about the Court's

insistence on maintaining a subjective approach to the entrapment defense were put
to rest. Not only did the majority reaffirm the Court's preference for the subjective
approach, see id at 63, but Justice Brennan, long an advocate of the objective
approach, also recognized that as a matter of stare decisis, the debate was over and
the proponents of the subjective view had won. See id. at 66-67 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
29. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992); Mathews, 485 U.S.
at 63; Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976); Russell, 411 U.S. at 435-36;
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.

30. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
31. See Brian T. Feeney, Note, Scrutiny for the Serpent. The Court Refines
EntrapmentLaw in Jacobson v. United States, 42 Cath. U. L Rev. 1027, 1028 (1993)

(describing the holding of Jacobson and its purported impact on the law of
entrapment).

32. See United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing that the court's interpretation of predisposition conflicted with that of
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (en

banc)); see also United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 1997) (adopting the

definition of predisposition advocated by the Seventh Circuit in Hollingsworth and
recognizing the contrary view taken by both the First Circuit in United States v.
Gendron, 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994), and the Ninth Circuit in Thickstun).
33. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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now been clouded by the Court's decision in Jacobson.34
Although allegedly based on the "presumed" intent of Congress,
the entrapment defense, as noted above, is a judicially-created
doctrine. 3 Therefore, analyzing legislative history or statutory text
will be of no use in trying to ascertain the precise scope of this
defense. The legal universe of the entrapment defense in federal
courts consists primarily of six decisions handed down by the Court
from 1932 to 1992. Understanding this universe will therefore be
critical before any real assessment of the competing circuit court views
can occur.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE SUPREME COURT'S
ENTRAPMENT JURISPRUDENCE

Because the entrapment defense is essentially a court-created

doctrine, understanding the contours of the defense requires an indepth understanding of the relevant case law. As noted earlier, the

Supreme Court has handed down several opinions explicitly dealing
with the entrapment defense. Only four of these opinions, however,
give any real idea about how to define predisposition. The other cases
either involve debates over the form of the entrapment defense, i.e.

whether predisposition should even be considered,36 or involve some
other procedural issue collateral to the merits of the entrapment
defense.37 Thus, the focus of this part will be on the four cases that
34. See supra note 30.
35. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of
the Entrapment Defense, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1011, 1037 (1987) (describing the
congressional intent rationale as "obviously fictional"); Louis M. Seidman, The
Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev.
111, 129-30 (stating that "it is painfully obvious that the statutory basis for the defense
is wholly fictional"); John David Buretta, Note, Reconfiguring the Entrapment and
Outrageous Government Conduct Doctrines, 84 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1953 (1996)
(describing the statutory intent rationale of the majority in Sorrells as a baseless
"judicial contrivance" because no statutory text or legislative history supported the
Court's interpretation); Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Preserving the
Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 305, 305 (1996)
(describing the entrapment defense as "a creature of judicial fiat borne of necessity in
consideration of the various evils that might otherwise go unchecked in its absence").
36. Cases that fall into this category include both United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973), and Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). In Russell, the
defendant's predisposition was conceded, and the Court therefore had no formal
opportunity to address the evidence in so far as it tended to establish the defendant's
predisposition. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 436. Nonetheless, the Court in dicta did make
several statements shedding light on the nature of the predisposition inquiry. See id. at
433-35. In Hampton, a divided court agreed that the traditional, subjective approach
to entrapment should be applied, but the Court could not agree on the specific
content of a due process defense. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 492. In the end, the Court
concluded that the defendant, whose crime of selling narcotics was possible only after
the Government had supplied him with the drugs, could not avail himself of an
entrapment defense because he was predisposed. See id. at 491-95.
37. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 61 (1988). In Mathews, the Court
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give some content to the predisposition requirement. Although the
Court did not give a concrete definition of predisposition in any of
these cases, the Court did have an opportunity to address several
factual scenarios that arguably involved some form of entrapment by
government officials. Thus, the Court had an opportunity to evaluate
evidence as it related to the question of predisposition. Furthermore,
by better understanding what the Court has traditionally looked for
when deciding whether a defendant was predisposed, a lower court
may be able to ascertain what the term "predisposition" means in the
context of the entrapment defense.
A. In the Beginning... Entrapmentand the Predisposition
Requirement-Sorrellsv. United States
The most significant aspect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Sorrells v. United States' was the Court's official recognition of the
entrapment defense. Additionally, because the Court did not have
any Congressional language on which to rely, either explicitly or
implicitly,39 the decision in Sorrells is an important source for gleaning
the content of the entrapment defense. Despite Justice Robert's pleas
to the contrary in his concurrence, the majority in Sorrells held that
the defendant's predisposition was relevant in ascertaining whether
the defendant was entrapped.' Thus, much of what we know about
the "predisposition" inquiry comes from the Court's examination of
the evidence in Sorrells.
In Sorrells, the defendant was charged with two counts of violating
the National Prohibition Act." The arresting agent, posing as a
tourist, accompanied three of the defendant's friends to the
defendant's house on July 13, 1930.4'2 While there, the government
agent, a former veteran of the First World War, learned that the
defendant had been a member of the agent's armed services division
during the war.43 During the visit, the agent asked to buy alcohol from
the defendant at least three times.' The defendant then left his
was faced with the question of whether a defendant could simultaneously deny
committing the underlying offense while claiming to have been entrapped. See id. at
62. While these positions would seem to be mutually exclusive, the Court held that a
defendant is entitled to plead seemingly inconsistent defenses. See id. (reversing the
decision by the court of appeals to deny petitioner an opportunity to raise inconsistent
defenses).
38. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
39. See id. at 446 (recognizing that literal interpretation of the statute did not
support the Court's decision).
40. See id. at 444-45.
41. See id. at 438.

42. See id. at 439.

43. See id.
44. See id at 439-40. The witnesses disagreed over the number of requests the
agent made for alcohol. The agent admitted to making three requests, but the
defendant's friends testified that the agent may have made as many as five requests
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house, and returned
45 with a half-gallon of liquor that he sold to the
government agent.
After being charged with two counts of violating the National
Prohibition Act, the defendant at trial pleaded not guilty, resting on
an entrapment defense.46 The trial court found that, as a matter of
law, there was no entrapment and thus refused to submit the issue to
the jury.47 The defendant was then found guilty by a jury, and
sentenced to eighteen months in prison.48 After the district court's
decision was affirmed by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
granted the defendant's writ of certiorari to decide whether there was
49
sufficient evidence to submit the issue of entrapment to the jury.
Before the Court could answer that question, it first had to reach the
conclusion that there was in fact such a defense in federal court. The
Court generally agreed that such a defense existed. The Court then
had to evaluate the evidence in the case to decide whether the issue of
entrapment should have been submitted to the jury. Although the
Court did not categorize the evidence as such, the Court discussed the
evidence as it pertained first to the Government's activities, and
secondly, to the defendant's disposition to commit the alleged
offense.5
At trial, both the defendant and the Government presented
evidence relating to the defendant's predisposition to commit the
alleged offenses. The defendant attempted to show his lack of
predisposition in several ways. First, those friends present during the
transaction testified that the agent made persistent requests for
alcohol. 2 Second, those same friends testified that the agent made
one of the requests immediately after telling the defendant that he too
had been a member of the defendant's division during his stint in the
armed services, taking advantage of the defendant's feelings of
camaraderie.5 3 Third, the defendant had several witnesses testify as to
The Government rebutted this
the defendant's good character.'
testimony by presenting three witnesses who claimed "that the

for alcohol. See id. at 436-40.
45. 'See id. at 439.
46. See id. at 438.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 438-39.
49. See id. at 439.
50. See id. at 443.
51. See id. at 441-42.
52. See id. at 43940.
53. See id. at 440.
54. See id. Three of the defendant's neighbors, as well as an official of the
company for whom the defendant worked, testified that the defendant was of good
character. See id. In addition, the company officer testified to the fact that the
defendant had worked "continuously without missing a pay day since March, 1924."
Id.
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defendant had the general reputation of a rum-runner." 5
The Court, however, noted that there was "no evidence that the
defendant had ever possessed or sold any intoxicating liquor prior to
the transaction in question."56 Viewing the evidence in its entirety,
the Court concluded that the issue of entrapment should have been
submitted to the jury and thus reversed the lower court, remanding
the case for further proceedings?51 Nowhere in its opinion did the
Court explicitly define predisposition. Further elaboration as to the
meaning of that term would have to wait for another day.
B. Sherman v. United States
In Sherman v. United States,5 8 the Court was again faced with a
claim of entrapment. The defendant, Sherman, was charged with
conducting three sales of narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 174.11
As in Sorrells, the defendant was convicted at trial after asserting a
defense of entrapment.'
Unlike the defendant in Sorrells, the
defendant in Sherman was able to present his case to the jury.6 '
However, the jury rejected the claim of entrapment and found the
defendant guilty.62 Notwithstanding the jury's verdict, the Court
agreed to hear the case to decide whether the defendant had been
entrapped as a matter of law.'
In Sherman, a government informant sought to induce the
defendant, a recovering drug addict, to commit a crime by repeatedly
asking the defendant to supply him with drugs.'" When the repeated
requests did not work, the informant appealed to the defendant's
55. Id. at 441.
56. Id.
57. See id at 452. By saying that the jury should have resolved the issue of
entrapment, the Court was impliedly saying that a reasonable jury could have found
that the defendant lacked the predisposition to commit the alleged offense. In fact,
the Court clearly stated this when describing its evaluation of the evidence:
It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for
which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent,
that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous
disposition to commit it but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that
the agent lured defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by
repeated and persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking
advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as
companions in arms in the World War.
Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
58. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
59. See i. at 370.
60. See id. at 370-71.
61. See id at 372.
62. See id.
63. See id.at 370 ("The issue before us is whether petitioner's conviction should
be set aside on the ground that as a matter of law the defense of entrapment was
established.").
64. See id. at 373.
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sympathy for a fellow addict to persuade the defendant to commit the
alleged drug offense.'
The defendant finally agreed to assist the
informant, supplying him with narcotics on three occasions in
November of 1951. 66 Given the evidence of the Government's
conduct, the Court said that it was "patently clear that [the defendant]
was induced by [the government informant]."6' 7 However, like the
majority in Sorrells, the Court in Sherman recognized that the
entrapment inquiry did not end with a finding of inducement. The
Court also had to assess whether the defendant was predisposed to
commit the crimes for which he was charged. s
The Government argued that, notwithstanding the conduct of its
agents, the defendant's predisposition to commit the crimes rendered
the defense of entrapment unavailable. 69 The Government believed
that the defendant was predisposed because he "evinced a 'ready
complaisance' to accede to [the informant]'s request."7 The Court,
however, rejected this argument, saying that the evidence simply did
not support a finding of predisposition.7
The Court gave some indication as to what type of evidence would
have sufficed to support the jury's finding of predisposition. First, the
Court noted that the evidence did not show that the defendant himself
was actually in the trade of selling illegal narcotics. 72 Second, the
Court observed that when the defendant's home was searched, no
illegal narcotics were found.73 Moreover, the Court also recognized
that the evidence failed to establish any pecuniary motive for the
defendant's offenses.74
Finally, the Court suggested that, at a
minimum, a defendant's lack of reluctance could also be evidence of
the defendant's predisposition or lack thereof. 5
65. See id.
66. See id. at 371.
67. Id. at 373.
68. See id. at 376-77 (rejecting the idea that the Court should reformulate the
entrapment defense so as to do away with the predisposition inquiry).
69. The Court had no trouble concluding that the government informant was a
government agent for purposes of the entrapment defense. The Court noted that the
informant was "an active government informer," and that the government could not
therefore "make such use of an informer and then claim disassociation through
ignorance." Id. at 373-75.
70. Id. at 375.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. The Court never expressly said that a defendant's lack of reluctance to engage
in the criminal endeavor could be affirmative evidence of that defendant's
predisposition. However, the Court did say that the defendant's reluctance to commit
the crime in Sherman indicated that he lacked the predisposition to commit the crimes
for which he was charged in that case. See id. at 375 (recognizing that the defendant's
hesitancy to commit the crimes was evidence that he lacked predisposition and that
the Government must rebut this evidence with its own). If a defendant's reluctance
can be evidence that he lacks predisposition, one might logically conclude that the
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The evidence the Government did produce was also deemed
insufficient in the Court's eyes to sustain a finding of predisposition.
To support the jury's finding, the Government relied primarily on the
defendant's two previous narcotics convictions.
In 1942, the
defendant had been convicted of selling narcotics, and in 1946, he had
been convicted of possessing narcotics. 6 The Court, however,
recognized that the issue was not whether the defendant was ready to
commit the crimes in 1942, or even in 1946. Rather, the issue was
whether the defendant was ready to commit the crimes when the
informant approached him. The Court found that the nine-year-old
sales conviction and the five-year-old possession conviction could not
support a finding that the defendant was ready to commit the crimes
in 1951. 7 Furthermore, the Government failed to present any other
evidence relevant to the predisposition inquiry. As a result, the Court
found that the defendant had been entrapped as a matter of law."
Once again, the Court never explicitly defined the term
"predisposition," though the Court's analysis adds to the insight
provided in Sorrells as to how the Court may have viewed the term.
C. United States v. Russell
In United States v. Russell,79 the Court was not faced with a situation

in which the Justices had to evaluate evidence of predisposition. The
defendant in Russell conceded that a reasonable jury might have
found him predisposed to commit the crimes for which the defendant
was charged.' Thus, the Court had no formal opportunity to address
the contours of the predisposition requirement. Instead, the Court
was asked yet again to abandon the predisposition requirement and
adopt an approach to entrapment that focused exclusively on the
Government's allegedly outrageous conduct.8 '
converse proposition is also true.

In other words, if the defendant displays no

reluctance, a fact-finder might conclude that the defendant is predisposed. In fact,
subsequent cases have recognized that a defendant's "eagerness" to commit a crime
can be evidence of that defendant's predisposition to engage in the charged crime. See

Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992) (recognizing that a defendant's
eagerness is probative evidence of his predisposition but that such evidence has little

probative value when the eagerness is in response to an extreme government
inducement).
76. See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375.
77. See iL at 375-76 ("[A] nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-year-old
possession conviction are insufficient to prove petitioner had a readiness to sell

narcotics at the time [the informant] approached him...
7M See id-at 377-78.
79. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
80. See id- at 427. Because the Court refused to extend the entrapment defense to
predisposed defendants, this concession ultimately doomed the defendant's appeal.

See idL at 436.
81. See id. at 432-33

("Respondent

also urges..,

that we broaden

the

nonconstitutional defense of entrapment in order to sustain the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.").
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The Court rejected this request.' In doing so, however, the Court
may have explained inadvertently what the Court means when it
refers to a defendant's "predisposition." In upholding the subjective
view of the entrapment defense, the Court detailed the history behind
the entrapment defense in federal courts. It noted that the Court in
Sorrells first recognized the defense, but that it gave protection only to
those "otherwise innocent" persons in whom the Government had
implanted the disposition to commit the alleged offense.83 By
allowing only these defendants to assert an entrapment defense, the
Court in Russell recognized that "the thrust of the entrapment defense
was held to focus on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to
commit the crime."'
Thus, although the Court in Russell had no
occasion to decide whether the defendant was predisposed, the Court
did seem to equate "predisposition" with "intent."' 5
D. Jacobson v. United States
Jacobson v. United States, 6 the Court's most recent decision
concerning the entrapment defense, has created confusion among
circuit courts as to what the term "predisposition" means. The
defendant, Jacobson, was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A)
for knowingly receiving child pornography through the mail.'
Despite his plea of entrapment, the jury found him guilty, and the
court of appeals affirmed his conviction, saying that the Government
had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he was predisposed and
was thus not entitled to a defense of entrapment. 8
The Supreme Court granted the defendant's writ of certiorari to
decide whether the defendant had been entrapped as a matter of
law.89 Because the Government conceded that the defendant was
induced to commit the crime, the Court recognized that the issue was
whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the acts in
question.' The Court, however, made it clear from the very outset
that the defendant's predisposition had to be independent of the
Government's activities. 91 Accordingly, the Court focused on
82. See id. at 433-36.
83. See id. at 428-29.
84. Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
85. In fact, even Judge Posner's opinion in United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d

1196 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc), recognized that the Court in Russell had equated
predisposition to intent, a mens rea term. See id. at 1198. The Court's traditional view
of predisposition, however, had very little impact on Judge Posner's interpretation of
the predisposition requirement. See infra notes 127-64 and accompanying text.
86. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).

87. See id. at 542.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 547-48.
90. See id. at 542.
91. See id. at 553 ("Rational jurors could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that
petitioner possessed the requisite predisposition prior to the Government's
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"whether the Government carried its burden of proving that [the
defendant] was predisposed to violate the law before the Government
intervened."' Several members of the Court did not agree with the
majority's conclusion that predisposition should be measured at this
juncture. Instead, Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion joined by
three other Justices, argued that predisposition should be measured at
the time the Government actually solicits the defendant to commit the
alleged offense.93 Unpersuaded, the majority evaluated the evidence
by deciding whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant
predisposed before the Government first contacted the defendant.
The Government first made contact with the defendant after the
Government obtained his name from a mailing list of those who had
legally received magazines containing nude pictures of preteen and
teenage boys. 94 Within three months of the defendant's purchase of
these materials, Congress enacted a statute making the receipt of such
materials through the mail illegal. 95 After the new law was enacted,
postal inspectors discovered the defendant's name on a mailing list of
those who had previously purchased magazines containing sexually
explicit nude photographs of children.96 After obtaining defendant's
name from this list, "[t]here followed over the next 2 years repeated
efforts by two government agencies, through five fictitious
organizations and a bogus pen pal, to explore [the defendant's]
willingness to break the new law by ordering sexually explicit
photographs of children through the mail." 9
During this period of time, the Government used various tactics to
test the defendant's willingness to break the law. They started by
sending Jacobson brochures and other materials from fictitious groups
that claimed to be fighting censorship." Other mailings from these
groups had asked the defendant provocative questions about his
investigation and that it existed independent of the Government's many and varied
approaches to petitioner.").

92 Id. at 549 n.2. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the majority's
approach to the timing of the predisposition inquiry diverged from the Court's prior
decisions. See id. at 556-59. The majority rejected this argument, saying that its
holding with regard to the timing of the predisposition analysis was not -an
innovation in entrapment law." Id. at 549 n.2. For an excellent discussion on this
point, see Scott C. Paton, Note, "The Government Made Me Do It". A Proposed
Approach to Entrapment Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 Cornell L Rev. 995,
1023-26 (1994) (arguing that the majority's approach was the one most consistent with
prior case law).

93. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 556-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. As the Court noted, the defendant's receipt of these magazines was legal
under both state and federal law. Within three months of the defendant's purchase,
Congress changed the law, making the receipt of such sexually explicit pictures illegal

under federal law. See itL at 543.
95. See id
96. See id.
97. Id.

98. See id. at 543-44.
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sexual interests as part of a "survey." 99 At one point, the Government

even created a fictitious pen pal who wrote to the defendant to discuss
sexual interests that the two purportedly had in common." In March
of 1987, twenty-six months after the postal service mailing campaign
had begun, the defendant attempted to purchase child pornography
from a fictitious government organization that had mailed him a
brochure.''

Although the order was never filled, the defendant was

given another opportunity later that spring. Again, he attempted to
make a purchase." z When the materials were then delivered to his
home, the defendant was arrested for violating the federal statute in
question. 1°3
The Court recognized that when the defendant made his first order,
in March of 1987, he had become predisposed to committing the crime
in question."° The issue, however, was whether he was predisposed
before the postal service had commenced its mailing campaign nearly
two-and-a-half years prior to that point. 105 To answer that question,
the Court divided the Government's evidence into two categories: (1)
evidence developed before the Government's contact with the
defendant and (2) evidence gathered during the course of the
Government's investigation.0 6

Because the Court ruled that predisposition must be measured prior
to

the time the

Government approaches

the

defendant, the

Government's most important evidence was its pre-investigation

evidence. 10 7 The only piece of pre-investigation evidence that the

Government proffered was the defendant's legal purchase of
99. See id. at 544.
100. See id. at 545.
101. See id. at 546, 552.
102. See id. at 547, 552.
103. See id. at 547. Jacobson was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1994),
which prohibits knowingly receiving through the mails a "visual depiction [that]
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct ..."ld
104. See Jacobson,503 U.S. at 550.
105. As the majority stated:
Where the Government has induced an individual to break
the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, as it was in
this case, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal
act priorto first being approached by Government agents.
Id. at 548-49 (emphasis added). See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
106. See Jacobson,503 U.S. at 550.
107. The Court did not find post-investigation evidence to be irrelevant, but it did
note that evidence of predisposition gathered after the Government's initial contacts
with a defendant may be suspect, because any predisposition such evidence might
show could have resulted from the Government's inducement efforts. See id. at 553.
Therefore, where the Government has engaged in an extensive campaign to induce a
defendant to commit a crime, the only practical way for the Government to show that
a defendant was predisposed is for the Government to present evidence that shows
the defendant's disposition to commit the alleged crime prior to contact with the
Government.
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According to

the majority's view, this evidence simply was not of sufficient
probative value to indicate the defendant's predisposition to break the

law in order to obtain child pornography." The defendant's decision
to order the magazine may have demonstrated his "predisposition to
view sexually oriented photographs that are responsive to his sexual
tastes; but evidence that merely indicates a generic inclination to act
within a broad range, not all of which is criminal, is of little probative
value in establishing predisposition.""'
The majority then turned to the post-investigation evidence offered
by the Government. The Government's key piece of evidence from
this category was the defendant's eager response to the government-

sponsored solicitation."' Ordinarily, the Court noted, this would
suffice to indicate the defendant's predisposition." 2 Again, the Court
indicated that, as of May 1987, the defendant was predisposed to
purchase such material." 3 The problem, said the Court, was that the
Government could not prove that the defendant's predisposition was
independent of the Government's many and varied approaches to

108. See UL at 550-51.
109. See id- at 550 ("[Tlhis is scant if any proof of petitioner's predisposition to
commit an illegal act, the criminal character of which a defendant is presumed to
know."). The majority's analysis of this evidence created another point of contention
between it and the dissent. The dissent argued that the majority's position amounted
to a requirement of specific intent to break the law. See id. at 559-60 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The majority rejected this notion, arguing instead that proof that the
defendant "engaged in legal conduct and possessed certain generalized personal
inclinations is not sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
would have been predisposed to commit the crime charged independent of the
Government's coaxing." Id. at 551 n.3.
110. Id at 550.
111. The defendant's "eager response" to the solicitation was not the only piece of
post-investigation evidence offered by the Government. The Government also
attempted to show the defendant's predisposition by introducing surveys the
defendant had submitted to the government-sponsored fictitious organizations. See id.
The defendant's responses to the surveys indicated an interest in pre-teen
pornography. See id. Like the defendant's legal purchase of the pornographic
magazines, this evidence was dismissed by the Court as having little or no probative
value. See id Although both pieces of evidence indicated the defendant's interest in
child pornography, neither piece of evidence demonstrated the defendant's
willingness to break the law in order to obtain such material. See id. at 551.
112. As the majority noted:
Had the agents in this case simply offered [the defendant] the opportunity to
order child pornography through the mails, and [defendant]-who must be
presumed to know the law-had promptly availed himself of this criminal
opportunity, it is unlikely that his entrapment defense would have warranted
a jury instruction.
Id. at 550. The problem in Jacobson, however, was that "[the evidence that [the
defendant] was ready and willing to commit the offense came only after the
Government had devoted 2 years to convincing him that he had or should have the
right to engage in the very behavior proscribed by law." Id. at 553.
113. See i at 550.
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him.114 Thus, whatever probative value the defendant's eager
response might have had two-and-a-half years earlier, it had little or
no probative value in March of 1987, in light of the Government's
extensive mailing campaign. Because neither the pre-investigation
evidence nor the post-investigation evidence adequately established
the defendant's predisposition to commit the alleged offenses, the
Court held that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law. 1 6 In
a passage that would later be critical to the present debate among the
circuits regarding the meaning of predisposition, the Court
summarized the case as follows: "When the Government's quest for
convictions leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding
citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely' would have never run
afoul of the law, the courts should intervene. 117
Such was the state of entrapment law in 1992. Several Court
opinions had addressed, in some fashion, the predisposition
requirement. Though the Court never explicitly defined the concept,
it had no trouble evaluating evidence of predisposition in its
entrapment cases. Unfortunately, none of those cases involved a
purely "white collar" offense, with the defendant's spoken word as
evidence of the required mens rea. In the wake of Jacobson,a litigant
reasonably might have believed that he or she could parse these
decisions and come up with a definition of predisposition that would
be generally accepted. Reasonable or not, this belief was shattered
two years later when the Seventh Circuit decided United States v.
Hollingsworth.'18
III. DISAGREEMENT OVER THE PROPER MEANING OF
"PREDISPOSITION"

In the wake of the Court's decision in Jacobson, the circuit courts
have split as to how to properly define the term predisposition. The
Seventh Circuit now defines a predisposed person as someone who, if
left to his own devices, likely would have committed the charged
crime." 9 The focus of this approach is not only on the defendant's
mental state, but also includes his objective circumstances. 120 To put it
differently, "but for" the Government's actions, would the crime have

114. See id. at 553.

115. "[Defendant's] ready response to these solicitations cannot be enough to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that he was predisposed, prior to the Government
acts intended to create predisposition, to commit the crime of receiving child
pornography through the mails." Id. at 553.
116. See id. at 542.

117. Id. at 553-54.
118. 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994); see also infra notes 118-64 and accompanying text
(analyzing the Hollingsworth opinion).
119. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200.
120. See id.
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been committed?12 1 In contrast, the First Circuit has held that a
predisposed defendant is someone who would be willing to commit a
crime if given an ordinary opportunity.' "
Whether such an
opportunity would likely have been given to the defendant had the
Government not intervened is irrelevant. Although there are
semantic differences in the standards used by other circuits, these two
approaches are, for most purposes, the basic alternatives from which
the courts must choose in the future." The next question is which
approach should be adopted.
At some point, absent Congressional intervention, 24 the courts will
have to resolve the debate over the meaning of predisposition. This
need has become especially serious in light of the increased
politicization of so-called "verbal" crimes. Assuming that prosecutors
and investigators continue the "traditional" practice of using
informants to induce such "verbal" crimes by targeted public officials,
this resolution needs to arise sooner rather than later and therefore
should be confronted first by the courts.
Which approach should lower courts adopt? This question can be
approached from two perspectives. First, one can ask narrowly which
approach represents the most honest interpretation of the Jacobson
decision. After all, if Jacobson can be read to clearly support one
view or another, that view should control lower courts absent some
compelling policy reason to the contrary. Although stare decisis is
admittedly a less than glamorous way to resolve a legal issue, our
system of justice generally requires that future courts adhere to the
principles set forth in prior decisions, at least until Congress addresses
the issue.
The problem, however, is that Jacobson contains some ambiguous
language that arguably supports lower courts on both sides of the
debate. One might argue that because Jacobson is ambiguous, courts
are free to resolve the issue either as a matter of policy or upon the
equities of a particular case, including the rule of lenity in criminal
cases. The problem with this approach, though, is that the "policies"
supporting the entrapment defense have been created entirely by the
Supreme Court."z One cannot, therefore, extract policies from the
Court's prior decisions without also looking at the treatment the

121. See Marcus, Back from the [Alnost] Dead, supra note 27, at 234.
122. See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 962 (1st Cir. 1994).
123. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit endorsed the definition of predisposition
given by the First Circuit in Gendron though phrasing it slightly differently. As that
court stated, a defendant is predisposed if he is "read[y] and willing[] to engage in the
charged crime absent any contact with the government's officers or agents." United
States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 624 (11th Cir. 1995).
124. See infra note 217 (recognizing Congress's ability to change the entrapment
defense because it is not of Constitutional dimension).
125. See supra Part I.

1218

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Court has traditionally given to the predisposition question. 2 6 Thus, if
Jacobson alone cannot resolve the debate, past decisions must be
analyzed in the aggregate in order to decide which broader social
policy is most consistent with the Court's entrapment jurisprudence.
No matter how one approaches the question, the resolution ultimately
may be the same: the Court itself, both in Jacobson and its earlier
decisions, unfortunately has never shown much concern for a
defendant's objective circumstances.
It has instead looked at
predisposition as a mens rea issue that inquires into a defendant's
willingness to engage in criminal activity irrespective of the
Government's inducement-a measure of a particularly ambiguous
kind, since in all entrapment cases, as a preliminary matter, we begin
with the assumption that the defendant did, in fact, possess the
requisite mens rea to commit the crime in question, yet, was at the
same time induced by the Government.
Prior to Jacobson, the circuit courts uniformly agreed that the
predisposition issue was a mens rea issue that measured the
defendant's theoretical willingness to commit the charged offense
without inducement by the Government.12 7 In 1994, however, the
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, interpreted the
126. In order to precisely understand the contours of the policy being used to
support a legal position, an advocate should always understand the legal context from
which the policy arises. If taken at a very high level of abstraction, a policy expressed
in a statute could support any number of legal positions. For instance, if Congress
ever chose to enter into the entrapment debate, it could pass a statute defining the
contours of such a defense. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
Hypothetically, Congress could enact this entrapment statute in order to prevent
abuses by law enforcement officials. Congress might even choose to enact a two-part
statutory scheme similar to the framework today recognized by the Court. The first
prong of the defense would address the government's law enforcement techniquesthe inducement. With respect to the second prong, Congress, as did the Court in
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), might choose expressly to extend this
defense only to non-predisposed defendants. See id. at 451. A defendant asserting an
entrapment defense under this statute might argue that the government's conduct
should be dispositive. In other words, the policy of the statute is to prevent abuses by
law enforcement officials.
Allowing a defense of entrapment any time the
government has acted badly would further this statutory purpose. This statutory
purpose, if taken at a high-level of abstraction, arguably supports such a position.
Yet, no one would argue that a hypothetical statute should be so interpreted if
Congressional intent is truly the deciding factor in light of the two-part statutory
framework. In deciding how to define predisposition, a court should be equally wary
of extracting principles from prior decisions by the Court and using them to support a
specific interpretation of predisposition. Principles announced in the Court's prior
decisions must be considered in light of the context in which they were given.
Otherwise, such principles, as in the example above, may be used to support a
position that is entirely inconsistent with the meaning for which they were intended.
127. See generally United States v. Cecil, 96 F.3d 1344, 1348 (10th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was disposed to commit the crime before Government involvement);
United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 366 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v.
Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938,
943 (3d Cir. 1986) (same).
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Court's decision in Jacobson as a departure from this view of
predisposition. According to Judge Posner, the Court in Jacobson

"clarified" the meaning of predisposition by requiring an examination
into the defendant's objective circumstances. " Thus, for a defendant
to be predisposed, he must not only be willing to commit the charged
crime, his objective circumstances must also be such that he would
have likely 29committed the crime even if the Government had not
intervened.1

Judge Posner asserted several premises for this reading of the
Jacobson decision. As an initial premise supporting his position,
Judge Posner argued that Jacobson, despite its language to the
contrary, was a decision that "changed the landscape of the
entrapment defense."' 3 Judge Posner then cited several circuit court
cases to support this proposition.131 The problem, however, is that
none of these circuits support Judge Posner's position in United States
v. Hollingsworth.3 2 Furthermore, the Court in Jacobson expressly
disavowed the notion that its holding represented a departure from

the Court's traditional approach to entrapment law. 33 Not to be
dissuaded by the Court's denial, however, Judge Posner argued that
"it is not unusual for a court to change the law without emphasizing its

128. See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994).
129. See id.
130. Id.at 1198.
131. See id. Judge Posner, in arguing that Jacobson worked a change in the
meaning of predisposition, argued that "[c]ases both in this and in other circuits,
besides the panel decision in this case, recognize that Jacobson has changed the
landscape of the entrapment defense." Id. For a discussion of these cases and their
holdings, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
132. For instance, the Seventh Circuit stated that its decision to reverse the lower
court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was "strongly buttressed by the
fact that [the defendant's] plea came six months before the Supreme Court decision
breathing new life into the entrapment defense." United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755,
760 (7th Cir. 1993). The Seventh Circuit never referred to any substantive changes in
the defense brought about by Jacobson. See id. In United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d
1472, 1483 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit did refer to the "new standard"
enunciated in Jacobson. But as that court made clear, the standard to which it wvas
referring involved the time at which predisposition must be measured. See id.("[Tlhe
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to
commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by government agents.")
(quoting Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992)). Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Mklsian, 5 F.3d 1306, 1310-11 (9th Cir. 1993), also discussed
Jacobson as it related to the timing of the predisposition inquiry. The Ninth Circuit
case of United States v. Skarie, 971 F.2d 317, 321 (9th Cir. 1992), was also cited by the
Hollingsworth court to support its position. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1198. Yet,
the Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the analysis used by the Seventh Circuit in
Hollingsworth. See United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1997). As
one article suggests, one could plausibly argue that Jacobson did not alter the
entrapment defense even in the manner suggested above, regarding the timing of
predisposition. See Paton, note 92, at 1023-26. Irrespective of that point, however,
none of the decisions cited in Hollingsworthsupport the notion that Jacobson worked
a wholesale change in the meaning of predisposition.
133. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549 n.2.
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departures from or reinterpretation of precedent; emphasis on
continuity is characteristic of common law lawmaking even when
innovative, and the doctrine of entrapment is a common law
doctrine."'"
After setting the stage by arguing that Jacobson had changed
entrapment law, Judge Posner then moved on to the substance of his
argument: that the Court in Jacobson had narrowed the definition of
predisposition, requiring greater proof from the Government on that
issue. How did he reach this conclusion? First, he argued that this
interpretation provided the only logical means of explaining the
Court's holding. As he explained:
[H]ad the Court in Jacobson believed that the legal concept of
predisposition is exhausted in the demonstrated willingness of the
defendant to commit the crime without threats or promises by the
government, then Jacobson was predisposed, in which event35 the
Court's reversal of his conviction would be difficult to explain.
Thus, because the Seventh Circuit in Hollingsworth could not
believe that the Court would have acquitted Jacobson under a
definition of predisposition focused only on the defendant's
willingness to commit the crime without inducement, it assumed that
the Supreme Court must have had a different definition of
predisposition in mind when it decided the Jacobsoncase.136
Judge Posner's contention that Jacobson cannot be explained
without resorting to this expanded definition of predisposition is
flawed. Whether or not the Supreme Court was correct in its
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence, nothing in the Jacobson
opinion suggests that the Court believed the defendant to be someone
"willing" to purchase child pornography without the urging of the
Government. In fact, the Court expressly found the evidence
inadequate to support such a conclusion. First, the Court decided that
the defendant's interest in child pornography, established by his legal
purchase of a magazine containing child pornography, did not suffice
to establish his predisposition to violate the law in order to obtain
such material. "Evidence of predisposition to do what once was
lawful is not, by itself, sufficient to show predisposition to do what is
134. Hollingsworth,27 F.3d at 1198. In dissent, Judge Easterbrook chastised Judge
Posner for ignoring the express language of the Court:
Jacobson v. United States, which the majority invokes to justify its novel
treatment of entrapment, purported to leave this comer of the law as the
Court found it.... [M]ore often language tracking prior law means that
nothing has changed.... Judges of an inferior court do best to take doctrine
seriously, to treat the Justices as honest expositors.
Id. at 1212 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 1199.
136. Judge Posner elaborated, saying that "[i]t was not as if the government had to
badger Jacobson for 26 months in order to overcome his resistance to committing a
crime. He never resisted." Id.
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now illegal, for there is a common understanding that most people
obey the law even when they disapprove of it."'" This statement
clearly sets forth the Court's belief that the evidence was insufficient
to establish Jacobson's willingness to violate the law in order to obtain
child pornography.
Second, the Court completely discounted the defendant's lack of
reluctance in Jacobson because of the protracted nature of the
Government's inducement efforts. As the Court noted, "[b]y the time
petitioner finally placed his order, he had already been the target of 26
months of repeated mailings and communications from government
agents and fictitious organizations."" Thus, although the defendant
was predisposed by the time he finally placed the order in May 1987,
"the Government did not prove that this predisposition was
independent and not the product of the attention that the
Government had directed at [the defendant] since January 1985."'' t
Once again, the Court's position seems clear: although the evidence
demonstrated the defendant's willingness to purchase child
pornography in May 1987, this willingness could have been a product
of the Government's extensive attention and not the defendant's
predisposition to commit the charged offense.14 Because the preinducement evidence did not establish the defendant's willingness to
violate the law without such efforts (at least in the eyes of the
majority),
the Court had no choice but to find entrapment as a matter
141
of law.
One commentator questioned the Court's decision to reverse the
jury's verdict, arguing that the Court gave insufficient weight to the
evidence presented by the prosecution.1 2 Regardless of where one
stands on that issue, it is clear that the Court did not believe that the
137. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 551. Judge Posner's failure to address this portion of the
Court's opinion is hardly surprising. The Court's focus on the legality of the
defendant's prior conduct is relevant only if the Court was concerned about the
defendant's state of mind, as opposed to his objective circumstances. If the defendant
in Jacobson was so eager and willing to purchase child pornography prior to the
Government's involvement, the Court would not have paused to consider this
evidence. That the Court did so reflects its concern that this defendant may not have
been willing to violate the law without the government's inducement efforts.
138. Id at 550.
139. I.
140. "[lIn Jacobson the Court was not concerned with the defendant's
positioning... but rather with the fact that the government's inducement campaign

lasted over twenty-six months and the defendant's ultimate willingness to purchase
the unlawful child pornography was in large part due to the government's repeated
persuasive efforts." Hollingsvorth,27 F.3d at 1211 (Coffey, J., dissenting).

141. "Rational jurors could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
possessed the requisite predisposition prior to the Government's investigation and

that it existed independent of the Government's many and varied approaches to [the
defendant]." Jacobson,503 U.S. at 553.

142. See Paton, supra note 92, at 1028 (arguing that the evidence presented in
Jacobson entitled the jury to find that the defendant was predisposed).
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evidence established Jacobson's willingness to engage in illegal
activity absent the inducement by the Government. 4 3 If Judge Posner
is puzzled as to how the Court could take such a position, his position
is arguably justified. But when he insinuates that the majority's
conclusion is so unreasonable as to be nonexistent, he is simply
ignoring a decision reached by the highest court in the land.
Not surprisingly, Judge Posner did not rest exclusively on this
dubious proposition to support his reading of Jacobson. Instead, he
sought to support his position with explicit language from Jacobson.
As his opinion explained, the Jacobson majority articulated a
definition of predisposition "not found in previous opinions.' 14 This
"definition," found near the end of the Court's opinion, stated that
"[w]hen the Government's quest for convictions leads to the
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his
own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law, the courts
should intervene.' 14 From this statement, Judge Posner argued that
Jacobson had "clarified" the meaning of predisposition to include an
objective component. 146 Hence, according to Judge Posner, the key
question in ascertaining a defendant's predisposition is to ask whether
the defendant, "if left to his own devices," is someone who likely
would have "run afoul of the law.' 1 47 Moreover, whether a person is
likely to "run afoul of the law" depends not only on the defendant's
willingness to violate the law, but also on his or her objective
circumstances. 48
As noted above, Judge Posner did not believe that the Jacobson
majority regarded the defendant as unwilling to violate the law
without inducement. 49 Instead, Judge Posner argued that the Court
believed that Jacobson was unlikely to run afoul of the law because of
his objective circumstances. 50 Specifically, Judge Posner argued that
because of Jacobson's geographical location and limited access to
child pornography, it is unlikely that he would have run afoul of the
law if the Government had not intervened.' 51
To support this
143. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1211 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 1199.
145. Jacobson,503 U.S. at 553-54.
146. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200.
147. Id. at 1199. "The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous training
or experience or occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that if the government
had not induced him to commit the crime some criminal would have done so." Id. at
1200.
148. See id. at 1200.
149. See id. at 1199; supra note 132.
150. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199.
151. Judge Posner discussed the defendant in Jacobson and noted:
[As a] farmer in Nebraska, his access to child pornography was limited. As
far as the government was aware, over the period of more than two years in
which it was playing cat and mouse with him he did not receive any other
solicitations to buy pornography. So, had he been "left to his own devices,"
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argument, Judge Posner noted that the Government was unaware of
any mailings received by the defendant from those outside the
Government during its two-and-a-half year investigation.'
Judge Posner conveniently avoided noting the context in which the
majority's recognition of this fact was discussed. The majority stated
that the Government had failed to adduce any evidence that the
defendant "had ever intentionally possessed or been exposed to child
'
pornography."153
The Court then noted that, as far as the
Government was aware, the defendant had not received any mailings
from a non-governmental source during the course of its
investigation.1" When put in context, the fact that the defendant may
not have received any questionable mailings from private sources does
not show any concern by the Court about whether the defendant was
someone likely to be exposed to this material. Instead, the Court
seemed concerned only about the defendant's interest in obtaining
such material (which might have been shown by his proactive efforts
to receive these "questionable mailings").
Moreover, if the majority was so concerned about the defendant's
limited access to child pornography, one wonders why the Court
would fail to mention this fact during the analysis portion of its
opinion. The majority did recognize that, as far as the Government
was aware, the defendant had received no questionable mailings from
private sources during the course of the Government's investigation.'"
The Court, however, pointed out this fact in Part I of its opinion, the
section that sets forth the case's factual backgroundY"- In Part IIof
the opinion, the analysis section, the Court never expressly referenced
the defendant's limited access to child pornography.'
Thus, the
Court did not rest its decision on whether the defendant, because of
his objective circumstances, was unlikely to run afoul of the law.
Instead, the Court was only concerned about whether the defendant
was willing to violate the law in order to obtain child pornography
"prior to" and "independent of" the Government's inducements. Ss
What then, did the Court mean when it said that the courts should
intervene "[w]hen the Government's quest for convictions leads to the
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his
in all likelihood, he would "have never run afoul of the law."

Id-at 1199 (citations omitted).
152. See id at 1199 (citing Jacobsonv. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 546 (1992)).
153. Jacobson,503 U.S. at 546.
154. See id

155. See id.
156. See d.
157. As Judge Ripple remarked in Hollingsworth, "'one can search the Jacobson

opinion in vain for any indication that the Justices showed the slightest interest in
bestowing upon the concept of predisposition 'positional as well as dispositional
force."' Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1217 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority

opinion, id. at 1199).
158. See Jacobson,503 U.S. at 553.
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own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law[?]' 1 59 Did
the Court mean that defendants who are willing to violate law, but
who are in a position where such a violation is unlikely to occur,
should be given the benefit of the entrapment defense? If read
literally, the Court's statement might support such a conclusion. The
Court, however, did not mean that any defendant who is unlikely to
run afoul of the law, for whatever reason, should be entitled to an
entrapment defense. In fact, the Court in Jacobson posited a
hypothetical that directly undercuts such a notion:
Had the agents in this case simply offered [the defendant] the
opportunity to order child pornography through the mails, and
[defendant]-who must be presumed to know the law-had
promptly availed himself of this criminal opportunity, it is unlikely
that his entrapment defense would have warranted a jury
instruction."W
The Court's indifference to a defendant's objective circumstances
could not be more obvious. The Court recognized that if an
opportunity to commit a crime was presented without any
inducements, the defendant's eager acceptance of such an opportunity
would amply demonstrate the defendant's predisposition, rendering
the entrapment defense unavailable. 6 The Court never qualified this
statement by discussing the probability of such an opportunity
occurring if the defendant was "left to his own devices."
Put in context, this statement by the Court does not appear to
endorse Judge Posner's interpretation of Jacobson as a case that
redefined the predisposition requirement to include a positional
element. 62 Instead, the statement seems to reiterate the traditional
standard of predisposition. After all, if a defendant is unwilling to
commit a crime without the Government's inducements, then that
defendant is a "law-abiding citizen" who is "likely to never run afoul
159. Id. at 553-54 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 550.
161. See id.
162. In Hollingsworth, Judge Posner argued that Jacobson did not add an
additional element to the entrapment defense. As he explained, the defense still
contains only two elements: inducement, and most importantly, predisposition. See
Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199. As he reads Jacobson, the Court "clarified" the
meaning of predisposition by pointing out that predisposition is "not a purely mental
state," but instead has "positional as well as dispositional force." Id. at 1200.
However one wishes to characterize Judge Posner's interpretation of Jacobson, it
does require an assessment of the defendant's position or objective circumstances.
According to the standard he proposes, in addition to establishing the defendant's
willingness to commit a crime, the government must now also show that the
defendant had the ability to commit the crime "if left to his own devices." Id. at 1198.
This additional burden on the Government may be characterized as a third step to the
entrapment defense, or the second step to the second element of the entrapment
defense. Because the Government's burden remains the same under either approach,
how one chooses to characterize the burden is irrelevant.
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of the law." For these defendants, a court should intervene and allow
an entrapment defense. The Court's opinion, however, in no way
endorses the notion that a person willing but unlikely to commit a
crime is the sort of "law-abiding citizen" for whom an entrapment
defense should be available.163
Now look at the disputed passage in Jacobson: "When the
Government's quest for convictions leads to the apprehension of an
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely
would have never run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene."' 64
The language in Jacobson appears to be nothing more than a
reformulation of the standard used in Sorrells. As in any entrapment
case, the defendant must lack predisposition in order to take
advantage of the defense." The use of phrases such as "otherwise
innocent" and "law-abiding" in Sorrells and Jacobson appear to be
synonyms for defendants who lack predisposition. Thus, before one
can even discuss the probability that the defendant will commit the
charged crime, the defendant must be classified as an "otherwise lawabiding citizen." Nothing in the Court's analysis suggests that willingbut-unlikely criminals should be put in this group. As Judge
Easterbrook aptly noted, "[i]solated phrases do not alter the law when
the bulk of an opinion professes otherwise.'' 1 Thus, not only was
Judge Posner incorrect when he argued that Jacobson cannot be
explained under the traditional standard of predisposition that focuses
only on the defendant's state of mind, but he also incorrectly asserted
that the Court's use of the word "likely" requires an assessment of a
defendant's objective circumstances.
To be fair, Judge Posner is not alone in endorsing this
interpretation of Jacobson. In fact, a leading commentator on the
entrapment defense, Paul Marcus, has joined Judge Posner in
advocating this "but-for causation" approach to predisposition.167
163. In his Hollingsworth dissent, Judge Easterbrook argued that the disputed

passage from Jacobson was nothing more than a recharacterization of the Court's
traditional entrapment standard. "Every opinion contains language slightly different

from its predecessors, if only for the sake of elegant variation." Id. at 1212. What was
the "elegant variation" in Jacobson? Compare the following statement in Sorrells v.
United States, where the Court held:

The evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the act for which
defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent, that it was
the creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous disposition to
commit it but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent
lured defendant, othervise innocent, to its commission by repeated and
persistent solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of the

sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as companions in
arms in the World War.
287 U.S. 435,441 (1932) (emphasis added).
164. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54 (emphasis added).
165. See supra note 28.
166. Hollingsworth,27 F.3d at 1212 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).

167. See Marcus, Back from the [Ahnost] Dead,supra note 27, at 222-23.
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Professor Marcus argues that the Jacobson opinion represents a
fundamental shift in the application of the entrapment defense. "The
language of the Supreme Court in Sherman and Jacobson signals
genuine movement from an exclusive focus on the defendant's state of
mind to a much more searching view of the Government's
behavior. ' 168 According to Professor Marcus, the Court has adopted a
"but for causation" approach to entrapment; if the defendant would
not have committed the crime but-for the Government's involvement,
the defendant should be entitled to an entrapment defense.
Furthermore, as Judge Posner recognized, whether a defendant will
commit a crime depends not only on his willingness but also on his
position or objective circumstances. 69 If this view of entrapment is
accepted, the defense will become much more popular, and
prosecutors presumably will become much more reluctant to indict
people for crimes induced by government informants.
Like Judge Posner, however, Professor Marcus misinterprets
Jacobson when he said that the Court endorsed this causationoriented approach to entrapment.1 71 Professor Marcus relies on the
dubious proposition espoused by Judge Posner that Jacobson can be
7
explained only by resorting to this new definition of predisposition.1 '
He too greatly emphasizes the defendant's lack of reluctance and how
the Court could not possibly have believed that the defendant was
unwilling to commit this crime. 72 Like Judge Posner, Professor
Marcus ignores the Court's handling of the defendant's lack of
reluctance. For the Court, the defendant's lack of reluctance had little
probative value in establishing his predisposition because the
defendant's eagerness to violate the law could easily have been the
result of the Government's protracted mailing campaign and not the
defendant's independent desire to purchase child pornography. 173 An
honest reading of the Court's opinion leads to the inevitable
conclusion that the Court was not satisfied that Jacobson would have
committed this
crime without the Government's extensive
74
inducements.
To the extent that Professor Marcus argues that Jacobson shifted
the focus from the defendant's state of mind to the Government's
conduct, 75 he is partially correct. No doubt Jacobson has led many
lower courts to give more attention to the Government's conduct in
assessing a defendant's predisposition. 76 The problem, however, is
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 219.
See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200.
See Marcus, Back from the [Almost] Dead,supra note 27, at 222-23.
See id. at 230-31.
See id.
See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540,553 (1992).
See supra notes 133-41.
See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
See Marcus, Back from the [Almost] Dead, supra note 27, at 225-27.
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that Professor Marcus never adequately explains why the lower courts
have taken the Government's conduct into consideration. The reason
is not because Jacobsonignored the defendant's state of mind. To the
contrary, the Court's primary concern in Jacobson was that the
defendant's state of mind was the product of the Government's
prolonged attention, evidenced by a twenty-six-month mailing
campaign."
Professor Marcus is correct when he stated that
Jacobson requires a more searching inquiry into the Government's
conduct, but the focus on the Government's conduct is inexorably
intertwined with inquiry into the defendant's state of mind. In other
words, the Court is only concerned about the Government's conduct
because of the effect such conduct might have on the defendant's state
of mind.
The Court's approach does resemble a causation inquiry, but not in
the "but-for" sense that Professor Marcus advocates. Instead, the
Court asks whether the defendant's willingness or desire to commit
the crime is a result of his previously held mental state or the
Government's inducement efforts.178 In Jacobson, the Court decided
that although the defendant was willing to violate the law and
purchase child pornography in May of 1987, the Government failed to
show that this willingness was the result of his preconceived mental
state and not the Government's extensive mailing campaign."
If Jacobson is so clear, one might logically ask why both Judge
Posner and a leading entrapment scholar like Professor Marcus would
mischaracterize the Court's holding. Maybe these two respected
scholars have simply misconstrued the Court's language, or perhaps
underneath their purported interpretation of Jacobson lies another
agenda.180 In support of their position, both Judge Posner and
Professor Marcus argue that as a policy matter, their "but-for
causation" approach to predisposition leads to the most socially
productive results."" Judge Posner contends that if resources are used
on criminals who, if left alone, would not commit crimes, "resources
that could and should have been used in an effort to reduce the
nation's unacceptably high crime rate are used instead in the entirely
sterile activity of first inciting and then punishing a crime."',
177. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 552-53.
178. See, eg., United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting expansion of the two-prong entrapment test).
179. See Jacobson,503 U.S. at 553.
180. An examination of Judge Posner's writings indicates why he may not be

substantively enamored with the traditional subjective approach to entrapment. As
he has noted in the past, "mental entities in law-intent, premeditation, 'free will'...
are entities of distinctly dubious ontology." See Richard A. Posner, The Problems of
Jurisprudence 167-68 (1990). Because the traditional approach to entrapment has
treated predisposition as a "mental entity," Judge Posner's discomfort with such a
standard is understandable.
181. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
182. United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.,
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Intuitively, this argument has great appeal. After all, if a person is not
likely to violate the law in the absence of government intervention,
either because he is unwilling or unable, why should we squander
resources prosecuting him. The money could be better spent on those
who in all probability will violate the law without the Government's
inducement.
The problem, however, is that the Court has never endorsed such a
utilitarian approach to the issue of entrapment. 3 Again, look back to
the hypothetical offered by the Court in Jacobson.'" The Court made
it clear that a person who affirmatively responded to an initial
solicitation (without further inducement) would likely be denied even
a jury instruction on entrapment. 185 As a factual matter, the person
could be in the same position as the defendant in Jacobson, an
isolated Nebraska farmer. This person might never be exposed to
such a solicitation if the Government fails to make the offer. Yet, as
the Court makes clear, a person who takes advantage of this
opportunity will not be entitled to a defense of entrapment because
their ready acceptance of the opportunity amply demonstrates
predisposition under a standard that focuses only on the defendant's
willingness to commit such a crime without inducements by the
Government.186 The Court never paused to consider, as Professor
Marcus's approach would seem to require, whether such an
opportunity would likely have been presented in the Government's
absence. Thus, Jacobson cannot plausibly be read to support the
"but-for causation" approach to predisposition advocated by
Professor Marcus.
Furthermore, despite the intuitive appeal of Judge Posner's law and
economics theory, one can seriously question whether his causationoriented approach to predisposition leads to more socially productive
results. First, prosecutors would be forced to prove that if they had
not offered the defendant an opportunity to commit the crime,
someone else would likely have offered it."8 Those who support
concurring).
183. To see the influence of Judge Posner's law and economics theory in his
entrapment decisions, one need only refer back to the Kaminski opinion. See 1009-10.
In that case, Judge Posner argued that "if the police are just inducing someone to
commit sooner a crime he would have committed eventually, but to do so in
controlled circumstances where the costs to the criminal justice system of
apprehension and conviction are minimized, the police are economizing on
resources." Id. at 1009.
184. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
185. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992).
186. See id.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1213 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Ripple, J., dissenting). Among other things, Judge Ripple noted that prosecutors
must now show that the defendant had a "sufficient aptitude" to commit the crime.
Id. at 1217; see also Eliot Rothstein, Note, Criminal Law-United States v.
Hollingsworth: The Entrapment Defense and the Neophyte Criminal-When the
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Judge Posner's position, such as Professor Marcus, dismiss this
concern and dogmatically assert that such a prosecutorial burden
would not be onerous.ms Yet they fail to explain how the Government
should go about proving how some party not involved in the criminal
case would have acted in the Government's absence. Second, no
matter how unlikely, there is always a chance that some private
individual might offer the defendant an opportunity to engage in a
criminal endeavor. Those defendants willing to accede to such a
request therefore pose a threat to society."s
IV. POLICY CHOICES SUPPORT THE NEED FOR A MORE SPECIFIC
UNDERSTANDING OF ENTRAPMENT AS IMPOSING AN
ADDITIONAL MENS REA PROOF REQUIREMENT

Criminal laws that lack the support of a substantial societal majority
because of a failure to incorporate a clear moral component are likely
to fail. The Court's creation of the entrapment defense, applicable
when government agents create or induce a crime, was a re-assertion
of this moral component of criminal law. The heightened importance
of recognizing such a moral component in enforcement targeting
"crimes" based substantially on the defendant's mens rea, when the
evidence consists largely of his spoken word, cannot be
overemphasized, particularly in an era of "political" crimes
investigated by independent counsel.
The Court in recent years, however, has been reluctant to engage in
such a policy-making role, leaving such matters to elected officials. 19°
Commission of a CriminalAct Does Not Constitute a Crime, 17 W. New Eng. L Rev.

303, 330 (1995) (discussing the burdens on prosecutors with respect to first-time
offenders).
188. See, eg., Marcus, Back from the [Almost] Dead, supra note 27, at 236.
Professor Marcus says that a positional inquiry such as that adopted by the
Hollingsworth court "hardly imposes an onerous burden on the prosecution." Id. He
claims that those defendants who exhibit little reluctance will demonstrate their

predisposition, rendering the defense practically unavailable. See id.This conclusion

hardly follows from the standard he advocates. Even if a defendant is willing to

commit the crime without any pressure by the Government, under the standard

proposed by Professor Marcus, the Government must still show that the defendant
would likely have faced such an opportunity had the Government not made the offer.
He fails to explain how the Government should go about proving what hypothetical
actors would do in the government's absence.

189. To put the matter in law and economics terms, society receives a benefit from

capturing those people who are willing to commit crimes should the opportunity be

presented. Is that benefit worth the costs (both in resources and in terms of the lost
opportunity to pursue other criminals) of going after those who are not "likely" to
commit crimes absent government inducement? Arguably not, but the question the

courts must ask is whether they are in a better position vis-a-vis the executive branch,
the body charged with enforcing the law, to make such a judgment regarding the
allocation of executive resources.
190. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973) (declining to extend the
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Jacobson, despite the pleas of Judge Posner and Professor Marcus, is
no different. The Court in Jacobson did nothing more than apply the
traditional entrapment defense to a very special set of facts. The
Court did not purport to break new ground with its decision.' 9' Thus,
whatever utilitarian merits Judge Posner's approach to entrapment
might have, his position simply does not represent the definition of
predisposition used by the Court in Jacobson and lacks an adequate
moral component.
A. An "OrdinaryOpportunity" Analysis
If Judge Posner's "but-for" approach to predisposition is
inconsistent with Jacobson, one must then ask whether an "ordinary
opportunity" analysis fits with the definition of predisposition
implicitly adopted by the Court in that case. This predisposition
question asks whether a defendant would be willing to commit a crime
if given an ordinary opportunity."9 In United States v. Gendron, 93
then-Judge Breyer defined an "ordinary opportunity" as a
government-sponsored solicitation that cannot be classified as an
improper inducement.1 94 As one may recall, government inducement
of the crime is a necessary element of an entrapment defense. 95 If
inducement cannot be established, a defendant will not be able to
even raise an entrapment defense. Moreover, simply offering a
defendant an opportunity to commit a crime, without more, does not
establish government inducement. 196 Thus, as Judge Breyer conceived
the entrapment defense, once the Government's inducement has been
established, the Government must show that the defendant would
have been willing to commit the charged crime in the absence of such
an inducement. In other words, if the Government were to simply
offer the defendant an "ordinary opportunity" to commit a crime,
without more, would the defendant be willing to take advantage of
such an opportunity?" 9 If the answer is yes, Justice Breyer argues that
entrapment defense to non-predisposed defendants and acknowledging Congress's
power to change the doctrine should it be so inclined).
191. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549; see also United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d
1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[A]pplying settled entrapment law.").
192. See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 1994).
193. 18 F.3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994).
194. See id. at 961.
195. See supra note 28.

196. As Judge Breyer defined it, "[a]n improper 'inducement,' however, goes
beyond providing an ordinary 'opportunity to commit a crime.' An 'inducement'
consists of an 'opportunity' plus something else-typically, excessive pressure by the
government upon the defendant or the government's taking advantage of an
alternative, non-criminal type of motive." Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961 (citations omitted).
Judge Breyer then lists a variety of situations where courts have found improper
inducements. See id. at 961-62.
197. See id. at 962 ("[Is] the defendant 'predisposed' to respond affirmatively to a
proper, not to an improper, lure?").

2000]

ENTRAPMENT AND THE SPOKEN WORD

1231

such a defendant should not be entitled to a defense of entrapment.
Unlike Judge Posner's "but-for" approach to predisposition, Judge
Breyer's definition, although vague, fits nicely with the Court's
analysis in Jacobson. The Court, in fact, seems to have endorsed such
an approach explicitly in the hypothetical posited in Jacobson. As
discussed earlier, the Court said that a defendant's eager response to a
mere opportunity to commit a crime would almost certainly destroy
that defendant's hopes of asserting a defense of entrapment." The
problem, as Judge Breyer recognized in Gendron, was that the
defendant in Jacobson was not simply offered an opportunity to
commit a crime. Instead, the Government badgered him for nearly
two-and-a-half years before finally giving him the opportunity to
commit the crime. 199 Because the Government could not show that
the defendant was willing to commit such a crime before such coaxing,
the Government failed to establish that the defendant would have
been willing to commit the charged offense if given an "ordinary
opportunity."'
Judge Breyer's approach also has textual support in Jacobson. The
passage used by Judge Posner to support his definition of
predisposition more accurately reflects the type of analysis endorsed
by Judge Breyer in Gendron. 1 The Court's reference to an
"otherwise" law-abiding citizen supports Judge Breyer's description of
the predisposition inquiry. As he puts it, the "otherwise" reference
requires a court to "abstract from.., present circumstances.":- A
court must "assume away ...the present circumstances insofar as they

reveal government overreaching" and "ask how the defendant likely
would have reacted to an ordinary opportunity to commit the
crime. , 203

Why should the Government's overreaching be "assumed away?"
Is such a statement consistent with Jacobson's emphasis on the
Government's conduct? Absolutely. Judge Breyer does not argue
that government misconduct is irrelevant in assessing predisposition.
As the Jacobson Court noted, the Government's conduct has a
bearing in assessing the probative value of the defendant's reluctance
In answering the
in relation to the Government's solicitation.
198. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540,550 (1992).
199. See id
200. See Gendron, 18 F.3d at 963 (noting that the government in Jacobson did
much more than provide an ordinary opportunity to buy child pornography, a fact
that was conceded by the Government).
201. That passage says: "When the Government's quest for convictions leads to the
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely
would have never run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene." Jacobson, 503
U.S. at 553-54 (emphasis added).
202. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 962.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553.
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ultimate question of predisposition, however, the court (or jury) must
"assume away" the Government's conduct and ask how the defendant
would have responded had that conduct not been present. As Judge
Breyer recognized, one knows how the defendant responded to the
inducement. To ask how the defendant would respond in similar
circumstances would make the predisposition inquiry a tautological
one. 205 The issue is how he would respond to an "ordinary
opportunity" to commit the crime-one that does not involve the sort
of excessive pressure of an improper inducement. 206 Because the
opportunity in Jacobson was "ordinary," in Judge Posner's view, the
Gendron analysis failed to explain the Court's decision in Jacobson.
As with the Jacobson decision, however, a closer reading of the
Gendron case by Judge Posner might have cleared up his confusion.
Justice Breyer did not purport to define "ordinary" by reference to
private inducements. Instead, by "ordinary," he meant opportunities
that did not rise to the level of an "improper inducement. ' 27 He
described an "improper inducement" as "an 'opportunity' phs
something else-typically, excessive pressure by the Government
upon the defendant." ' 8 Thus, when Justice Breyer spoke of
"ordinary" opportunities, he simply meant government-sponsored
opportunities to commit crimes without excessive additional pressure.
He in no way defined "ordinary" with respect to the types of
inducements that private actors might use to encourage someone to
commit a crime. In answering that question, the defendant's response
to the Government's
actual inducements may or may not be
209
relevant.
If the Court wishes to adopt an approach that is consistent with

205. When a defendant has already relented to the government's inducement, it
simply makes no sense to ask whether he would relent to similar pressure in another
situation. As Justice Breyer recognized, a defendant's "present behavior virtually
compels an affirmative answer to the question phrased in this way." Gendron, 18 F.3d
at 962.
206. Understanding the meaning of an "ordinary" opportunity is critical to
understanding Justice Breyer's approach to Jacobson. In Hollingsworth, Judge
Posner described Justice Breyer's interpretation of Jacobson as follows:
Recently the First Circuit, struggling as are we to understand the scope of
Jacobson, suggested that all it stands for is that the government may not, in
trying to induce the target of a sting to commit a crime, confront him with
circumstances that are different from the ordinary or typical circumstances
of a private inducement.
United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1199 (7th Cir. 1994).
207. See Gendron, 18 F.3d at 962.
208. Id. at 961.
209. Where the defendant is reluctant in the face of the government's inducement
efforts, such reluctance may be probative evidence that the defendant lacks
predisposition. See supra note 75. In contrast, a defendant's eager acceptance of a
mere opportunity to commit a crime indicates the defendant's affirmative
predisposition to commit the charged crime. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550. As
Jacobson noted, however, a defendant's response may have very little probative value
when it occurs in the wake of extreme inducement by the government. See id. at 553.
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both the spirit and letter of Jacobson, the "ordinary opportunity"
analysis carries much promise. Instead of relying on far-fetched
readings of the facts, or isolated phrases in a particular sentence, the
"ordinary opportunity" analysis actually comports with the Court's
entire disposition of the legal issues in Jacobson. Whether the Court
will be content with following Jacobson in light of the possible
ambiguities in the case, however, is another matter.
Assuming that Jacobson was sufficiently ambiguous, and that the
meaning of predisposition cannot simply be ascertained by reading the
Court's decision in that case, how does a prosecutor prove
predisposition? An operating premise that should guide the courts in
answering this question is the notion that the entrapment defense is by
its very nature a limited defense, focusing more specifically on the
defendant's mens rea. To understand the limited nature of the
defense, one must go back to the Court's previous decisions that both
recognize and define the parameters of this defense.210 Again,
entrapment is an affirmative defense which is relevant only when the
defendant has, in fact, committed all elements of an offense, including
the requisite mens rea. Although criticized as having no explicit or
implicit statutory support, the Court initially premised the availability
of the entrapment defense on the intent of Congress. The Sorrells
Court did not believe that Congress would want its statutes enforced
when government agents persuaded innocent persons to commit
crimes so that they could then be prosecuted.1
Perhaps that is not what Congress desired. Yet, how could the
Court possibly have known this without some indication by Congress,
either in the text or legislative history of a criminal statute? In
Sherman v. United States,212 Justice Frankfurter, who also believed
that an entrapment defense should be available, acknowledged the
weakness in the Court's rationale: "In these cases raising claims of
entrapment, the only legislative intention that can with any show of
reason be extracted from the statute is the intention to make criminal
precisely the conduct in which the defendant has engaged.21 3 Other
commentators have also noted the fictional nature of the Court's
reliance on legislative intent to justify its decision.1 4 If one accepts
the notion that the Court was being fast and loose with its reasoning in
Sorrells, is there any reason the Court should feel bound to construe
the defense in light of a principle that is well-understood to be nothing
more than a legal fiction? After all, if the Court was creating this
210. See supra Part II.

211. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932).
212. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).

213. Id-at 379 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
214. See, e.g., Feeney, supra note 31, at 1036-38 (noting that critics have raised
objections about entrapment law, including the notion that legislative intent as the
basis for a defense is sheer fiction).
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defense from whole-cloth, why should the Court now feel obligated to
confine the defense to its original parameters? In other words, why
should the Court not simply "presume" that Congress would want
statutes enforced in a manner most consistent with notions of good,
efficient law enforcement policy?
The simple answer to these questions is that it is not the role of the
Court to make such policy choices. Perhaps the Court overreached in
Sorrells when it presumed that Congress would not want its statutes
enforced against "innocent persons" induced to commit crimes by the
creative activity of law enforcement officials. Arguably, if the Court
were deciding the issue on a clean slate, it should simply enforce the
statute as written or rely on a constitutional provision to deny
enforcement.215 The issue, however, is not one of first impression. No
matter how dubious the Court's reasoning may have been in 1932, the
present Court can still rely on the same rationale in interpreting the
entrapment defense. After all, the Court based its decision on the
intent of Congress.216 Perhaps the Court had no basis for inferring
such an intent in 1932. After sixty years of Congressional inaction in
the face of six Supreme Court decisions reaffirming the existence of
the defense, however, the present Court has ample basis for relying on
Congress's intent. Thus, the Court can safely rely on its previous
decisions as being consistent with the intent of Congress.
In sum, the logic is as follows: First, Congress prohibits certain
activities with criminal statutes. Those who fall within the intended
coverage of the statutes can be classified as "Group A." The Court
then "unjustifiably" protects a certain class, "Group B," from
coverage under these statutes.2 17 After the Court does this, however,
Congress fails to react and extend the scope of these statutes to
"Group B" over the course of sixty years and six Supreme Court
decisions that protected this class from the purview of the statute.
Thus, in light of Congress's long-standing inaction, the Court can now
justifiably conclude that "Group B" is outside the scope of Congress's
215. The Court in Russell made it clear that the judiciary should not have a
"chancellor's foot veto" over law enforcement practices of which it does not approve.
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973). Yet, the Court seems to have used

such a veto when it first recognized the defense of entrapment in Sorrells because the
Court had no explicit or implicit basis for inferring a Congressional intent to preclude
punishment in situations involving entrapment. In fact, the Court has identified
another possible defense in situations similar to entrapment: the outrageous conduct
defense founded upon principles of due process. The contours of such a defense, if it
even exists, are beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 24.
216. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
217. By referring to the government's actions as being "unjustifiable," the Court
may have no constitutional basis for refusing to enforce the statute. Because the
Court has stated that the run-of-the-mill entrapment case does not implicate a
defendant's due process rights, this assumption normally seems appropriate. See
Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32. However, due process considerations should play a role in
creating an interpretive rule for entrapment.
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intended coverage.
In United States v. Russell, the Court seemed content with such a
rationale. The defendant in that case was seeking to have the Court
In
extend the entrapment defense to predisposed defendants.21
construing the scope of the defense, the Court made reference to
those who criticized the "implied intent of Congress" rationale used
by the Sorrells Court to justify the entrapment defense.21 While the
Court acknowledged that such arguments were "not devoid of
appeal," it declined to revisit the issue yet again, noting that the Court
had relied on this rationale on two previous occasions.?2 Elaborating
even further, the Court later said:
[E]ntrapment is a relatively limited defense. It is rooted, not in any
authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what it
feels to have been 'overzealous law enforcement,' but instead in the
notion that Congress could not have intended criminal punishment
for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed
offense, but was induced to commit them by the Government.'
After reading the Court's opinion, one comes away with the almost
unmistakable impression that the Court relied on Congressional
inaction in making its decision. First, the Court acknowledges that the
rationale of the Sorrells Court, which rested on the implied intent of
Congress, might not be sound.m Nonetheless, the Court ultimately
relies on Congress's intent in construing the scope of the defense
because of the Court's two previous decisions regarding the issue.22
In fact, the Court at one point invites Congress to take action should it
find the Court's substantive definition of the defense to be
inadequate ' 4
Thus, the Russell Court seems to have endorsed an approach to
entrapment premised on Congressional inaction. The Court in
Sorrells may or may not have overreached when it protected certain
defendants in 1932 from coverage under federal criminal statutes. If
the Court misread Congress's intent, however, one would have
218. See id at 432-33.
219. In Russell, the Court observed:
Critics of the rule laid down in Sorrells and Sherman have suggested that its
basis in the implied intent of Congress is largely fictitious, and have pointed
to what they conceive to be the anomalous difference between the treatment
of a defendant who is solicited by a private individual and one who is
entrapped by a government agent.
Id. at 433.
220. See id. at 433-34.
221. Id. at 435.
222. See id
223. See id2
224. See id. at 433 ("Sorrells is a precedent of long standing that has already been
once reexamined in Shemian and implicitly there reaffirmed. Since the defense is not
of a constitutional dimension, Congress may address itself to the question and adopt
any substantive definition of the defense that it may find desirable.").
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expected Congress to react accordingly at some point during the past
sixty years. The Court, therefore, read Congress's inaction as an
implicit endorsement of the Court's decisions in Sorrells and Sherman,
and as license to now preclude application of federal criminal statutes
to entrapped defendants.
Relying on Congressional inaction, however, means that the Court
is confined to its previous decisions in defining the entrapment
defense. Because acquiescence presumes knowledge, Congress must
be aware of the interpretation to which it is supposedly acquiescing.
The Court in Russell understood this. After all, the Court could have
"presumed" that Congress would not want its statutes enforced
against anyone who was induced to engage in criminal activity by the
Government's agents. The Court declined to take such an active role,
however, and relied on the intent articulated in Sorrells and
reaffirmed in Sherman, which presumed only that Congress would not
want its statutes enforced against non-predisposed persons that were
induced to commit crimes by law enforcement officials.2 5 The former
approach represents nothing more than a whole-cloth amendment by
the judiciary of a federal criminal statute. The latter approach at least
possesses the virtue of relying on some tangible evidence of
Congressional intent.
B.

Toward a Focus on HistoricalEvidence of the Defendant's
Conduct Reflecting an OriginalMens Rea

How does "Congressional inaction" bear on the question of how
predisposition should properly be defined, particularly when the crime
consists of spoken words as implied mens rea? The operating
premise, as supported above, is that the entrapment defense is a
limited defense. As the Court in Russell recognized, "the defense is
not of a constitutional dimension. 22 6 The defense was originally and
is now based on the intent of Congress. 7 Additionally, no matter
how dubious the Court's initial presumption of legislative intent may
have been, the intervening years of Congressional inaction have
arguably legitimized what may have been an erroneous interpretation
of Congress's manifested intent. If this operating premise is correct,
then one can safely say that Congress does not wish for its criminal
statutes to be enforced against those defendants who are induced to
commit crimes, but who lack the predisposition to commit the
offenses. In other words, the Court can presume that there exists this
"protected class" of defendants whom Congress does not wish to
ensnare in its criminal net. The Court, however, cannot expand this
class without engaging in the same sort of illegitimate interpretation
225. See id. at 434-35.
226. Id. at 433.
227. See id.
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of Congressional intent that it arguably made in Sorrells.
Thus, in defining predisposition, the task should be to reconcile
prior cases and come up with a rule of interpretation for
predisposition that fairly can be said to depict the Court's traditional
approach to entrapment, balancing the twin needs to punish and deter
criminality, on one hand, and to prevent government overreaching on
the other. When the Court stated that non-predisposed defendants
should be exempt from prosecution, Congress could have been said to
have endorsed this principle through its inaction. Yet, Congress could
have endorsed only that which the Court had proposed.
Thus, the Court's past conception of predisposition should
necessarily control in future decisions. If the Court has traditionally
viewed a non-predisposed defendant as someone who would not likely
have committed the charged crime but for the Government's
intervention, then that definition should control because Congress,
through its inaction, has at least implicitly acknowledged that these
defendants are outside the scope of the relevant statutes. Conversely,
if the Court's previous decisions have viewed a non-predisposed
defendant as one who was not willing to commit the crime absent
government intervention, then that definition should also control, for
the same reason. If this premise is correct, and assuming for the
moment that Jacobson plausibly could be read to support the views of
either then-Judge Breyer or Judge Posner, the Court should attempt
to define predisposition by reconciling Jacobson with earlier
entrapment decisions like Sorrells and Sherman. The Court's task
would then be to look at these cases and come up with indicia of
predisposition that fairly can be said to represent the Court's
historical approach to the predisposition question, incorporating more
fundamental rules of levity and vagueness when the difference
between legitimate and unlawful conduct becomes speculative.
In discussing the entrapment defense, the Court has made several
statements that indicate that the Court has traditionally viewed the
predisposition requirement as a mens rea issue centering on the
defendant's willingness to commit the charged offense without
inducement by the Government. The first statement, not surprisingly,
comes from the Court's first entrapment decision in Sorrells. The
Court recognized that law enforcement officials must sometimes use
"artifice and stratagem... [in order] to catch those engaged in
criminal enterprises."' The Court, however, distinguished the use of
such tactics from situations where "the criminal design originates with
the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and
In these
induce its commission in order that they may prosecute."
228. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,441 (1932).
229. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
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situations, the Court ultimately concluded that a defendant should be
entitled to a defense of entrapment.2Y0
This statement gives some insight into the Court's conception of the
predisposition requirement.
The Court made it clear that a
predisposed defendant who does commit a crime could not take
advantage of the entrapment defense."3 The defense arises only when
the Government's agents "implant" the disposition in an originally
"innocent person."" 2 This is not done by providing a defendant with
the means he might not have otherwise had as a result of his objective
circumstances, but instead, as the Court suggests, by implanting in the
"mind" of the defendant the disposition or will to commit the
offense. 3 This statement by the Court thus lends credence to the
view held by a majority of the circuit courts that the predisposition
requirement is one that involves only the defendant's state of mind
prior to the Government's intervention (as well as at the time of the
offense, itself).31
In Sherman, the Court again made references to the predisposition
requirement that appeared to focus only on the state of mind of the
defendant. Sherman was a case in which the Court granted certiorari
to decide whether a defendant had been entrapped as a matter of
law."3 The Court recognized the factual issue that was presented at
trial: "whether the [government agent] had convinced an otherwise
unwilling person to commit a criminal act or whether [the defendant]
was already predisposed to commit the act and exhibited only the
natural hesitancy of one acquainted with the narcotics trade. 2 36 The
Court did not disagree with the way the issue was presented at trial,
where predisposition was equated with willingness. It only disputed
whether the evidence supported the defendant's conviction, ultimately
holding that it did not. 7 The Court appeared content with a standard
of predisposition that focused only on the defendant's state of mind,
230. In Sorrells, the Court stated:
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in
enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should
be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of
persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to
punish them.
Id. at 448.
231. See supra note 24.
232. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
233. See id.
234. See United States v. Cecil, 96 F.3d 1344, 1347-48 (10th Cir. 1996) (contending
that the prosecution must prove that the defendant was disposed to commit the
criminal act before being approached by government agents); see also United States v.
Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 360 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41,
43-44 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 943-44 (3d Cir.
1986) (same).
235. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 370 (1958).
236. Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
237. See id. at 375-76.
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specifically the defendant's willingness to engage in criminal activity
without the Government's inducement.'
Later in the opinion, the Court pointedly referred to the standard
that the prosecution was seeking to establish with its evidence: "The
Government's additional evidence in the second trial to show that
petitioner was ready and willing to sell narcotics should the
opportunitypresent itself was petitioner's record of two past narcotics
convictions.""u9 This statement gives some indication as to what the
Court is analyzing when it assesses the predisposition issue: is the
defendant ready and willing to commit the charged crime (here,
selling narcotics) should the opportunity present itself? The Court's
analysis indicates that the standard focuses only on the defendant's
state of mind.
Nowhere in the Court's statement is there any indication of concern
about the probability of such an opportunity occurringz2i The Court
seemed concerned only as to whether the defendant was "ready and
willing" if such an opportunity were to arise, irrespective of whether
such an opportunity was likely to occur.
Of course, proponents of Judge Posner's position might argue that
the word "ready" could have been a reference to the defendant's
objective circumstances. The predisposition inquiry, under this view,
should focus on whether the defendant was both willing and ready, in
the sense of being in the position to commit the crime, if an
After all, if a defendant is
opportunity were presented." 4
psychologically prepared to commit a crime, and if the defendant is
also in the position to commit that crime, then the Government's
inducement would likely affect only the timing of the offense, not its
actual commission.2 42

Such a reading of the word "ready," however, is inconsistent with
the Court's language in Sherman. First of all, as noted above, the
Court seemed content with the factual issue presented at trial:
whether the defendant was willing to commit the crime or whether he
was persuaded to commit the crime by the Government's agents. -'*
The Court never debated whether something more than the
defendant's mental state should be considered. Second, the Court's
discussion of the evidence presented by the Government makes it
clear that the Court was using the terms "ready" and "willing"
After stating what the defendant's two prior
synonymously.
convictions were supposed to prove-namely that the defendant was
"ready and willing" to commit the crime "should the opportunity
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See id. at 376-77.
Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
See i at 370-78.
See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (1994).
See i& at 1203.
See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371.
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present itself"--the Court then discussed the probative value of this
evidence.24
The Court found that a five-year-old possession
conviction and a nine-year-old sales conviction were insufficient to
establish the defendant's "readiness" to sell narcotics at the time the
Government approached the defendant, especially in light of the
defendant's efforts to deal with his addiction.245
As Judge Posner recognized in his Hollingsworth opinion, a drug
addict can be presumed to have the "ability" to commit a crime
without government intervention. 46 For such "traditional" targets of
sting operations, predisposition is established by showing that the
defendant is "willing[ ] to violate the law without extraordinary
inducements."247 Thus, when the Court in Sherman said that the
defendant did not have the "readiness" to commit the alleged offense,
it did not mean that he did not have the ability or contacts to commit
such a crime. Even Judge Posner would seem to concede that a
defendant such as the one in Sherman would meet his positional
test.24 8 Instead, when the Court used the word "readiness," it had to
mean that a defendant's willingness to sell narcotics in 1942 or 1945
did not establish his willingness to commit this same offense in 1949,
particularly in light of that defendant's efforts to overcome his drug
addiction. Because the Court used the word "ready" synonymously
with "willing," courts are left with a standard of predisposition that
focuses only on the defendant's state of mind, specifically the
defendant's willingness to commit the charged crime should the
opportunity present itself. 49
244. See id. at 375-76.
245. See id.
246. In Hollingsworth, Judge Posner explained:
A public official is in a position to take bribes; a drug addict to deal
drugs .... For these and other traditional targets of stings all that must be
shown to establish predisposition and thus defeat the defense of entrapment
is willingness to violate the law without extraordinary inducements; ability
can be presumed.
Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200.
Moreover, the defendant in Sherman established his "ability" to obtain drugs
without the Government's assistance because the case contained no allegations that

the Government provided him with the necessary source from which the sales might
be made. Thus, the defendant in Sherman was in the position to commit such a crime.

See Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373-75. The question for the Court was whether he was
willing to commit this crime without the government's inducements. See id. at 376-77.
247. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200.
248. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
249. In his Hollingsworth dissent, Judge Ripple argues that a defendant's
"readiness" to commit an offense is circumstantial evidence of the defendant's

willingness to commit such a crime without inducement by the Government. "tTjhe
alacrity with which the defendant accepts the invitation is circumstantial evidence of
his predisposition to commit the illegal act .... [Tjhe Supreme Court has reminded us
that predisposition is demonstrated by the defendant's 'ready commission of [a]
criminal act."' Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1215 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (quoting
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992)). Thus, as Judge Ripple argues,
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The Court confirmed this conclusion in United States v.Russell.25
As noted earlier, the Court had no formal opportunity to address the
predisposition requirement; the defendant in that case conceded that
51
a reasonable jury could have concluded that he was predisposed.
The Court did, however, discuss the entrapment defense and the role
predisposition historically played in the Court's previous entrapment
decisions. The Court noted that in Sorrells, "the thrust of the
entrapment defense was held to focus on the intent or predisposition
of the defendant to commit the crime."
Here again, the Court
reaffirmed its conception of what the predisposition inquiry is all
about.
Furthermore, the Court equated the predisposition
requirement to the mens rea element-the defendant's intent to
commit a crime." Thus, in Sorrells, Sherman, and Russell, the Court
gave every indication that the predisposition issue was one that
focuses only on a defendant's state of mind. The Court in these cases
never displayed any concern for the defendant's objective
circumstances.
To pick through the Court's opinions in this way might seem a bit
unrealistic, especially since the operating premise here is that
Congress was endorsing the Court's approach to the predisposition
issue. After all, if the Court's opinions must be dissected in such a
manner, can one really have expected Congress to know about the
Court's opinions that would support the foundation of any argument
based on Congressional acquiescence? The short answer to this
question is that the lower courts uniformly agreed prior to
Hollingsworth that the predisposition issue was one that focused
solely on the defendant's original state of mind.P The analysis of the
Court's opinions is meant only to support the interpretation implicitly
the Court has equated readiness with predisposition, and a defendant's eagerness to
commit a crime when presented with an opportunity establishes his or her
predisposition to commit the alleged offense. See Hollingsworth 27 F.3d at 1215. The

Court seems to have confirmed this statement when it said that a defendant's prompt
and affirmative response to a mere opportunity to commit a crime (with no further

inducements) would likely result in the defendant being denied an instruction for
entrapment. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992). Therefore, when

the Court uses the phrase "ready and willing," it is saying that the Government can
demonstrate the defendant's predisposition in one of two ways: (1) with direct
evidence of the defendant's willingness to commit the charged crime without

government inducements, or (2) with circumstantial evidence of the defendant's
willingness, specifically the defendant's ready response to the proposed opportunity.
"In this sense, the defendant's preparation for the opportunity is no doubt relevant
and probative on the issue of his predisposition. It is not, however, an independent
element of the defense." Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1215 (Ripple, J., dissenting)

(citations omitted).
250. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).

251. See id. at 433.
252. Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
253. See Lori J. Rankin, Casenote, Entrapment: A Defense for the Willing, Yet
Unready, Criminal?,63 U. Cin.L. Rev. 1487, 1512 (1995).
254. See supra note 127 (citing cases).
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reached by the lower courts prior to the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Hollingsworth.
An examination of the Court's entrapment
jurisprudence demonstrates that the Court's traditional approach to
the predisposition issue focused exclusively on the defendant's state of
5
mind with no regard to evidence of his objective circumstances.
Prior to Jacobson, the lower courts understood this without dispute.
Thus, to the extent Congress could have endorsed anything, it could
have endorsed only a view of predisposition that focused generally on
the state of mind of the defendant.
Finally, and more specifically, how should the prosecutor prove the
existence of a predisposed state of mind? The best source of such
evidence is the defendant's prior conduct, not speculative inferences
drawn from a "present" mens rea. Thus, to prove predisposition, a
prosecutor must include temporal, or dual, evidence of mens rea.
When entrapment is raised, the prosecution should be required (and
allowed) to demonstrate the prior conduct of the defendant that
initiated the decision to target him and to then prove possession of the
respective mens rea element at that time. In that sense, the induced
crime is merely corroborative of prior similar conduct with the same
mens rea. Further, the prosecution should be required to prove that
the defendant responded positively to the first significant
governmental inducement. In other words, the Government gets one
bite at the apple with respect to inducement. What particularly upsets
a court is the specter of repeated efforts by the Government to induce
a crime. If a target is given the opportunity to commit a crime by
government inducement but rejects that opportunity, continued
inducements generally should cease. Such a rule would place greater
pressure on the initial approach to a target by an informant and may
limit wiring of witnesses to only the task of obtaining evidence of prior
crimes.
Returning to the Lewinsky investigation, Lewinsky's preparation of
the "talking points" memo and delivery of that memo to Linda Tripp
suggested a corrupt motive and predisposition to obstruct justice prior
to inducement. What Lewinsky subsequently said to Tripp at their
wired meeting, therefore, was appropriate for prosecutorial focus
(assuming the general appropriateness of prosecuting a coverup
during a deposition in a civil case).
CONCLUSION

In a perfect world, Congress would step forward and resolve many
of the problems surrounding the entrapment defense-problems that
stem in large part from Congress's failure to take action on this issue
during the twentieth century. This is not, however, a perfect world,
and the courts will be forced to confront the entrapment issue more
255. See supra Part II.
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frequently in the future. Could the Supreme Court agree with Judge
Posner? Perhaps, but to do so would not only distort the Court's own
entrapment jurisprudence, but would also signal lower courts around
the country to disregard the spirit of the Court's opinions and
implement their policy preferences through thinly disguised
"readings" of the Court's decisions that excuse criminal conduct.
The Court should provide more specific guidelines in order to
clarify its opinion in Jacobson. If the Court reads Jacobson for what it
is, and not for what some would like it to be, the Court will be led to a
conclusion similar to that adopted by Justice Breyer in Gendron. For
better or worse, the standard of predisposition in the federal courts
focuses on the defendant's state of mind, and not on his or her
objective circumstances, both initially, prior to inducement, and at the
time of the induced crime itself. More particularly, when the crime
consists of spoken words induced by a government agent, prosecutors
should be directed to prove, and a jury to find, the relevant state of
mind by evidence of the defendant's prior similar acts that justified
the investigation and evidence that the defendant responded
positively to the first significant government inducement.

Notes & Observations

